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THE CONTINUITY PRINCIPLE,.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRAINT, AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Harold J. Krent*
Critics have lamented the amoebic quality of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. A test of general reasonableness proves to be almost
no test at all. In an era in which fighting against terrorism has gar-
nered the national limelight, all but the most intrusive law enforce-
ment measures seem reasonable when measured against the less
palpable assertions of privacy by individuals suspected of terrorism
and criminal wrongdoing more generally. Law enforcement authori-
ties can look through trash,1 screen travelers at transportation hubs,2
demand that suspects identify themselves, 3 stop motorists for pre-tex-
tual reasons4 and so forth. Indeed, the more that law enforcement
authorities are allowed to search, the less reasonable expectations of
privacy can become: we as a society become inured to the whittling
away of individual privacy. Given the growing acceptance of screen-
ing, checkpoints, and databases, courts largely have sided with law en-
forcement authorities in their continuing war on crime.
© 2005 Harold J. Krent. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Dean and Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I would like to thank
Kathy Baker, Tracey Maclin, and Mike Pardo for their comments on earlier drafts,
and thank Elizabeth Sietsema for her research assistance.
1 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
2 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989)
(using the example of airline passenger searches to illustrate that, when the risk of
harm is substantial, the government is justified in making reasonable searches);
United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding a warrantless
search of luggage in an airport reasonable, particularly because defendant had fair
warning of the search).
3 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
4 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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Fourth Amendment doctrine need not be so gelatinous. Courts
and commentators have overlooked at least one secondary standard
that lies just beneath the surface in a wide spectrum of Fourth Amend-
ment cases. Simply put, law enforcement authorities, with limited ex-
ceptions, must end searches and seizures once the objectives that
justified the searches and seizures have been completed. Although
this tenet, which I term the "continuity principle," does not affect our
understanding of what constitutes a search or seizure, it can serve a
vital role in confining the searches and seizures that take place.
The Warrant Clause embraces this principle of continuity, requir-
ing that law enforcement authorities must articulate the purpose and
ends of any search and any seizure before proceeding. The Clause
thereby creates a record upon which courts after the fact can deter-
mine the legality of a challenged search. A record requirement also
prompts each law enforcement official to deliberate a little longer and
more carefully before conducting a search or seizure. The Framers
wished to curb the abuses of the general warrants and writs of assis-
tance utilized in colonial times. 5 When warrants are not practicable,
adhering to the continuity requirement is even more important due
to the absence of both a record and ex ante oversight by a neutral
judicial official. Ex post enforcement of the continuity requirement is
one of the only means-in the absence of a warrant-to circumscribe
the discretion of law enforcement officials.
Indeed, in three cases this past term, the Supreme Court wrestled
with Fourth Amendment cases implicating the continuity principle,
but in none of the cases did the Court fully explore its relevance. In
Illinois v. Caballes6 the Court decided that a dog sniff of a stopped car
did not constitute a search and yet ignored the increased length of the
motorist's seizure necessitated by the dog sniff. The Court, in other
words, did not demand that the seizure of the motorist end when the
justification-investigating and/or ticketing the speeding-ceased.
5 For a discussion of the differences between general warrants and writs of assis-
tance, see BarryJeffrey Stern, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1385,
1390-91 n.16 (1994) (noting that writs allowed officers more discretion than general
warrants because they were not limited to an instance of wrongdoing; also, while gen-
eral warrants expired after execution, the authority of the writs remained good for
the life of the reigning sovereign).
For a more detailed discussion of writs of assistance and general warrants, see
JACOB W. LANDYNSKi, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-45 (1966);
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78 (1937) ("The writ empowered the officer
and his deputies and servants to search, at their will, wherever they suspect uncus-
tomed goods to be.").
6 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
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Similarly, in Muehler v. Mend7 the Court overturned a jury verdict
awarded against police officers who had detained the plaintiff, placed
her in handcuffs, and intermittently interrogated her for over two
hours while the officers searched the premises. In so doing, the Court
declined to rule on the plaintiff's argument in the trial court that the
officers extended her detention even beyond the time needed to con-
duct the search.8 In Devenpeck v. Alford9 the Court held that a civil suit
for an unconstitutional arrest should be dismissed when law enforce-
ment authorities had a legitimate reason to arrest a motorist even
though the justification proffered at the time was not valid. The
Court did not demand that the law enforcement authorities stick to
the original justification for the arrest.
In this Article, I explore the historical, doctrinal, and normative
underpinnings of the continuity principle, addressing how this funda-
mental tenet is of critical importance in limiting the discretion of law
enforcement officials under the Fourth Amendment. After a brief his-
torical survey, Part I examines continuity in the well established con-
text of searches effected through warrants. It then shows how that
same principle applies in warrantless searches as well. The Supreme
Court has in fact recognized in many cases that searches become un-
reasonable when authorities stray from the objectives underlying the
search, but it has not adorned its decisions with much justification.
Perhaps it should not be surprising, therefore, that lower courts have
declined to enforce the principle rigorously. Yet, stringent applica-
tion is necessary to prevent enforcement officials from routinely ex-
panding searches to fish for evidence of criminal conduct unrelated
to the reasons justifying the original intrusion into privacy. Rigorous
adherence to the continuity principle also deters enforcement offi-
cials from initiating searches on the mere hap that incriminating in-
formation can be obtained that is not connected to the reasons
legitimating the searches.
Part I next argues that the continuity principle should apply in
seizure as well as in search cases. Warrants at times are required for
arrests, and the scope of all seizures must be circumscribed by the
purpose for which the seizure was made. Accordingly, prolonging the
duration of a seizure to investigate unrelated crimes or for any other
reason breaches the continuity principle and thus violates the Fourth
Amendment.
7 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005).
8 Id. at 1472.
9 125 S. Ct. 588 (2004).
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In Part II, I then analyze Caballes, Muehler, and Alford from the
perspective of the continuity principle. Caballes should have called for
a relatively straightforward application of the continuity principle, for
the seizure was prolonged in order to conduct a criminal background
check and a dog sniff to investigate conduct unrelated to that justify-
ing the routine traffic stop. Curtailing the duration of the seizure is
critical to preventing. abuse by law enforcement officials. Instead, the
Court brushed aside the continuity issue, focusing on and rejecting
the defendant's principal claim that the dog sniff constituted a dis-
tinct search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Muehler
similarly raises the question whether detention must immediately
cease after the underlying objective that legitimated the detention is
satisfied. Although the Court declined to reach the issue, ruling in-
stead that the questioning and handcuffing by themselves did not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment, the case readily could have been
resolved on the basis that the detention was unreasonably prolonged.
On the other hand, I agree with the Court's conclusion in Alford that
law enforcement authorities should not be liable for an unlawful ar-
rest when a legitimate justification exists that should have been appar-
ent to a reasonable officer. The potential for administrative abuse in
such cases is marginal.
I conclude with more general thoughts on recognizing adminis-
trative constraints on law enforcement officials. Understanding the
continuity principle is a critical first step, but consideration of the po-
tential for overreaching by law enforcement officials has greater im-
port. When warrants are not required, law enforcement officials
should be circumscribed by constraints similar to those underlying the
Warrant Clause. Three interrelated facets of the encounter in particu-
lar should be considered. First, the more that individual enforcement
officials exercise discretion, the greater the potential deleterious im-
pact on privacy. Second, when many individuals are subject to compa-
rable searches and seizures, there is less likelihood that individual
privacy will suffer because no one individual or small group has been
singled out for disadvantageous treatment. Finally, the more that the
search or seizure stems not from the exercise of discretion by law en-
forcement officials but rather from considered departmental policy,
the greater the likelihood that the search has been checked by the
political process and should be considered reasonable. These factors
should help flesh out the contours of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment.
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I. THE CONTINUITY PRINCIPLE
A. History of the Warrant Clause
The Founders were well aware of the risk of government over-
reaching in law enforcement investigations. Time and again, officers
of the Crown in the colonial era engaged in broad ranging searches
and seizures. Pursuant to the writs of assistance and, on occasion,
general warrants, authorities could rifle through the contents of an
individual's home and use any information discovered in a subse-
quent proceeding, irrespective of whether they expanded the search
to pursue a new objective. Once in a house, in other words, every-
thing was fair game. And, law enforcement officials could decide
whether to arrest suspects without any oversight.
The historical events are not in controversy. Historians generally
have pointed to three episodes that highlighted the need for re-
straining law enforcement officials. Even a cursory examination of the
history points to the important protection afforded by specific war-
rants. Warrants may not have been needed in all contexts, and that is
where much of the historical argument lies, 10 but when required for
searches of homes, the imperative of specificity was clear.
First, in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, customs officials during
the mid-eighteenth century used general writs of assistance to search
for imported goods on which no tax had been paid.I1 Great Britain
10 See LANDYNSKI, supra note 5; LASSON, supra note 5; Tracey Maclin, The Complex-
ity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REv. 925, 930-58 (1997);
William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment 1602-1791: Origins and Original Mean-
ing (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file
with Kresge Law Library, Notre Dame Law School). For exceptions, see TELFORD TAY-
LOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE AND SURVEIL-
LANCE AND FAIR TRI.L AND FREE PRESS (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131 (199 1); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Prin-
ciples, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); WilliamJ. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393 (1995). These authors recognize the salience of the
historical examples but argue that the history led the Framers to eschew any reliance
on warrants whatsoever. In their view, the Framers, for a variety of reasons, frowned
upon all use of warrants. For an attack on their understanding of history, see Morgan
Cloud, Searching Through History; Searchingfor History, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1707 (1996);
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547
(1999).
11 Even before the Writs of Assistance Case, controversy over enforcement of cus-
toms laws arose. As Cuddihy relates, some customs officials in Salem "forced their way
into numerous houses, warehouses, and ships and seized vast quantities of weapons,
rum and molasses, much of which was not contraband liable to confiscation. [The
chief officer]'s behavior must have caused resentment, for his heavily armed crew had
threatened to shoot several citizens." Cuddihy, supra note 10, at 726.
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enlisted the colonies in its effort to gain commercial dominance. The
target was molasses, imported from the non-British West Indies, which
was a key to the rum trade. No resort to ajudicial official was required
to search for the molasses even in private houses. Although enforce-
ment of the tax had been lax, several merchants reacted to efforts to
search their premises with violence. On behalf of the merchants,
James Otis argued in the 1761 Writs of Assistance Case that the common
law prevented such general writs. He stressed that the writs granted "a
power that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty
officer."12 Indeed, customs officers "may enter our houses when they
please-we are commanded to permit their entry-their menial ser-
vants may enter-may break locks, bars and every thing in their way-
and whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court
can inquire-bare suspicion without oath is sufficient."'1 Much of the
protest centered on the excessive discretion vested in low level law
enforcement officials. After some delay on the part of the provincial
court, Otis lost the case, but the memory of the alleged injustices con-
tinued to rankle. The Massachusetts colonial legislature soon thereaf-
ter imposed far more stringent requirements on the writs, limiting
their duration.
14
Second, a more notorious set of cases arose amidst a political con-
troversy in England. John Wilkes in an anonymous pamphlet had de-
scribed the British Tory administration as "wretched puppets" and
"the tools of corruption and despotism."'1 Pursuant to general war-
rants, government officials were empowered to ascertain who had
published the pamphlet and to arrest those responsible. The warrant
directed officials "to make strict and diligent search for the authors,
printers and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper, intitled
[sic], The North Briton, No. 45 .. .and them, or any of them, having
found, to apprehend and seize, together with their papers."1 6 The
general warrant prompted officers to search the homes of at least five
suspected political opponents and led to the arrest of forty-nine indi-
viduals. 17 Authorities roused one suspect out of bed in the middle of
the night.' 8 Wilkes, a leading member of Parliament, was later seized
12 M. H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 342 (1978).
13 Id.
14 LASSON, supra note 5, at 65-66.
15 Cuddihy, supra note 10, at 886 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16 The King v. Wilkes, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 737, 737 (&B.), reprinted in 19 A COM-
PLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 981, 981 (T.B. Howell ed., London, T.C. Hansard
1813) [hereinafter COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS].
17 Cuddihy, supra note 10, at 893.
18 LASSON, supra note 5, at 44.
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when two of those arrested implicated him, and his papers were
carted off, including his will.' 9 Authorities released Wilkes shortly af-
ter due to parliamentary privilege.
20
In turn, Wilkes sued the officials contending that the general war-
rants were invalid at common law. Ajury agreed, and awarded Wilkes
substantial trespass damages. Wilkes then also sued the Secretary of
State who had issued the warrant, and won again. The cases were
much celebrated by the press in both England and the colonies.
Finally, Parliament reauthorized use of the general writ for cus-
toms searches in the Townshend Act of 1767.21 Frustrated by the cir-
cumvention of the Navigation Acts, British authorities hoped that the
new Act would permit much more effective enforcement of the cus-
toms laws. An influential citizen, generally thought to be Samuel Ad-
ams, protested that "our houses and even our bed chambers are
exposed to be ransacked, our boxes, chests, and trunks broke open,
ravaged and plundered by wretches . . . whenever they are pleased to
say they suspect there are in the house wares, etc., for which the dutys
[sic] have not been paid."22 The focus again was in part on the broad
leeway enjoyed by the law enforcement officials. 23 Despite the statu-
tory authorization, many colonial judges denied officials' requests for
general writs, influenced in part by the Wilkes precedents. Judge Wil-
liam Henry Drayton of Charleston, for instance, later complained in
1774 that "a petty officer has power to cause the doors and locks of
any man to be broke open, to enter his most private cabinet, and
thence to take and carry away, whatever he shall in his pleasure deem
uncustomed goods."
24
The lack of specificity in general warrants and writs led to a num-
ber of abuses, including broad searches of homes, the indiscriminate
seizure of personal papers, and the arrest of suspects without any
prior check as to the level of proof demonstrated. Merchants shud-
dered at the thought of officials rummaging through their houses and
personal effects-the specter of lower class individuals wandering
19 Id.
20 Wilkes, 95 Eng. Rep. at 737, reprinted in COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, supra
note 16, at 981.
21 LASSON, supra note 5, at 71.
22 Cited and discussed in Davies, supra note 10, at 602 n.139.
23 When authorities at dusk seized John Hancock's sloop Liberty for carrying con-
traband, a riot resulted, in part evidently because of the belief that any such seizures
could only be made in the day. LASSON, supra note 5, at 72 n.71.
24 Davies, supra note 10, at 582 n.83.
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through their homes was difficult to bear.25 The First Continental
Congress's list of colonial grievances against the British Parliament in
1774 included general writs.
26
To prevent such recurrences, 27 the Framers could have pursued
any number of approaches. For instance, they could have relied on
operation of the tort system, familiar to them from precedent in En-
gland, as some academics have argued.28 The threat of civil suits de-
ters unconstitutional action by raising the prospect of individual
officer liability. Officers may steer clear of unconstitutional searches
and seizures for fear of incurring liability. Tort suits against officials
were recognized as a primary means of deterring government
abuses .29
Alternatively, they could have established monetary penalties
against the government itself, encouraging better monitoring and
training of individual officers, and deterring individual officers from
conduct that would subject their governmental employer to liability.
Incidence of enterprise liability, however, was extremely rare in the
era of the framing. 30 Another option lay in the now familiar exclu-
sionary rule. Evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches
and seizures cannot generally be used in prosecutions. Individual of-
ficers would think twice about an illegal search for fear of later com-
promising an important prosecution. Excluding illegally obtained
evidence at trial did not emerge as a remedy, however, until the late
25 Id. at 577-78 (relating that the Framers "expressed outright disdain for the
character and judgment of ordinary officers. Indeed, the Framers' perception of the
untrustworthiness of the ordinary officer was reinforced by class-consciousness and
status concerns" (citation omitted)).
26 Id. at 567.
27 Abuses continued with searches of suspected Loyalists' houses during the Revo-
lutionary War period. Once in authority, the former Revolutionaries did not hesitate
to deploy wide-ranging searches to further their hold on power. As Cuddihy relates,
"Charles Wilson Peale, the famous portrait painter, and Matthew Irwin led teams of
soldiers that invaded houses throughout Philadelphia. The troops broke desks, burst
locks even when their owners were too ill to rise from their sick beds, and confiscated
books, personal papers and official records indiscriminately." Cuddihy, supra note 10,
at 1270. The Framers may not have fully repressed this memory in drafting the
Fourth Amendment.
28 Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 62 (1996).
29 Id.
30 Currently, enterprise liability is a familiar feature of our system. For example,
Congress in the Federal Tort Claims Act has waived the government's immunity from
suit for some unconstitutional actions taken by its employees, including unlawful
searches and seizures. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a) (2000).
[VOL. 8 1: 1
THE CONTINUITY PRINCIPLE
nineteenth century. 3 1 Or, the Framers could have hoped that their
new government would train and supervise law enforcement officials
better than had the Crown.
B. Function of the Warrant Clause
Instead, the Fourth Amendment provides that
[t] he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
32
The relationship between the two clauses has bedeviled commenta-
tors. 33 This article presupposes that the "Reasonableness" Clause
should be read as a gloss on the Warrant Clause-in other words, that
the Warrant Clause occupies the pivotal position in the Fourth
Amendment. Reasonableness is to be assessed at least in part by con-
sidering whether protections similar to those underlying the warrant
mechanism are present. Warrants or warrant-type protections are pre-
ferred whenever possible. And, so most academics have concluded
when considering the history related before. 34 Indeed, the Supreme
Court asserted in Warden v. Hayden3 5 that the Fourth Amendment
"was a reaction to the evils of the use of the general warrant in En-
gland and the writs of assistance in the colonies, and was intended to
protect against invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life."
36
Requirement of a specific warrant therefore is the critical step
taken by the Framers to protect personal privacy. First, prior to un-
dertaking a search, officials must have probable cause to undertake
any search or seizure. Second, they must present the information as-
sembled to a neutral magistrate for review, linking that probable
cause to individuals specified, premises to be searched, and items to
be seized. That oversight limits the potential for overreaching.
There is a third and related aspect to the Clause that has been
comparatively overlooked. The Clause requires officials to create a
record upon which their subsequent acts can be assessed. Forcing law
enforcement officials to create a record tempers spur-of-the-moment
31 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
32 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
33 See, e.g., supra note 10.
34 Cuddihy, supra note 10; Davies, supra note 10; Maclin, supra note 10.
35 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
36 Id. at 307.
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decisions and acts as a conservative force to limit hasty or ill-thought
out searches. At the margins, there likely will be less extensive
searches and seizures because of the need to draft an application and
due to the knowledge that the application will be reviewed by a neu-
tral magistrate.3 7 To a generation that feared the discretion of peace
officers,38 the check on haste served a critical protection. The latter
two aspects of the Warrant Clause in particular-review by a neutral
magistrate and the requirement of a record-work together to limit
the potential for abuse. Privacy-at least in the home-is too impor-
tant to leave to the frail protection afforded by after-the-fact balancing
under which authorities could largely justify their intrusion based on
whatever evidence they uncovered. Civil suits might well provide in-
sufficient protections from excessive government searches, particu-
larly because of the difficulty in proving and pricing the violations. As
a result, the threat of suit would insufficiently deter law enforcement
officials from arbitrary or excessive searches and seizures. Law en-
forcement officials must instead defend their actions based on what
was articulated before the search.
A warrant requirement is not without its costs. Before every
search takes place, a law enforcement official and a neutral magistrate
must spend time scrutinizing the objectives and the link between the
objectives and items to be searched. The resources demanded are
considerable. In a system that is regulated instead by tort or exclu-
sionary rules, only a fraction of the searches will ever be challenged
because the vast majority of searches either cause no harm or are
clearly constitutional.39 The Framers' decision to require ex ante re-
view in each case reflects their commitment not to relegate protection
for privacy to after-the-fact mechanisms, even though such mecha-
nisms-whether tort challenges or the exclusionary rule-allow far
greater adversarial process than the ex parte application for a warrant.
The Warrant Clause therefore commits authorities today to limits
before authorizing a search. Applying for warrants forces authorities
to specify the reason for the search and describe in detail the objects
to be seized. If the objective after the fact turns out to be unlawful,
the fruits of the search can be suppressed, and the officers subject to
37 Other mechanisms could have generated this advantage, such as an approval
by a prosecutor or even a higher up within the department. See William J. Stuntz,
Articles and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 892 (1991). Warrants for
electronic eavesdropping operate in this fashion by requiring approval of law enforce-
ment officials in Washington. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2000).
38 Davies, supra note 10, at 577-78; see also Maclin, supra note 10.
39 Stuntz, supra note 37, at 887-88. Moreover, damages from unlawful searches
may be difficult to quantify, even though Wilkes was successful.
[VOL. 81:1
THE CONTINUITY PRINCIPLE
suit under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, if the objects seized
differ from those in the earlier recitation, then they too can be sup-
pressed as the result of an unlawful search. The need to create a re-
cord prior to the search has long been recognized. A list of both the
objectives and the items to be searched provides a standard under
which courts after the fact can assess the reasonableness of law en-
forcement authorities' actions. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently
rejected the qualified immunity defense of an officer who conducted
a search based on a warrant that failed to particularize the items
sought: "This warrant did not simply omit a few items from a list of
many to be seized, or misdescribe a few of several items .... Rather...
the warrant did not describe the items to be seized at all."40 Indeed,
"unless the particular items described in the affidavit are also set forth
in the warrant itself ... there can be no written assurance that the
Magistrate actually found probable cause to search for, and to seize,
every item mentioned in the affidavit."
41
Other areas of law feature record requirements as well. Consider-
ing how the record requirement operates in those areas reinforces the
importance of the record in the search and seizure context. In ad-
ministrative law, the Chenery doctrine 42 serves a function similar to a
warrant. The validity of any agency's exercise of discretion-as op-
posed to its interpretation of law-typically turns on the rationale
used by the agency at the time of its action. The Supreme Court has
held that discretionary administrative action will only be upheld on
grounds articulated by the agency in the record. The Chenery doc-
trine in part limits agency power to make policy outside of public
scrutiny.
In Chenery, the SEC conditioned its approval of a public utility
holding company's reorganization on the officers' willingness to dis-
gorge shares of preferred stock they had purchased during the reor-
ganization period. The SEC had not found any wrongdoing but based
its demand upon court cases exploring the common law duty of fidu-
ciaries. The Supreme Court vacated the SEC's decision, holding that
the administrative agency had misread judicial precedents. 43 The
Court refused to speculate whether any other reasons justified the
agency's conclusion: "The grounds upon which an administrative or-
der must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its
40 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 558 (2004).
41 Id. at 560.
42 See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
43 Id. at 89.
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action was based." 44 Accordingly, a court must assess agency action
based on the rationales forwarded by the agency itself at the time of its
decision: "Courts may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rational-
izations for agency action."
45
Reviewing courts therefore will only allow agencies to defend
their actions on the basis of reasons articulated prior to judicial re-
view. As conditions or personnel change, agencies cannot substitute a
different rationale without reopening proceedings. If agencies reo-
pen the proceedings, then they must subject their new reasoning to
challenge by interested parties in either a rulemaking proceeding or
an adjudication. Efficiency may be lost, but at the gain of greater pro-
tection for the regulated public-policy can emerge more slowly. The
Chenery doctrine therefore is akin to the warrant requirement in forc-
ing agencies to deliberate more before acting and to precommit to
particular rationales for agency action.
46
The required precommitment by law enforcement authorities
protects citizens from expanded searches. For instance, consider a
prototypical Fourth Amendment case in which law enforcement au-
thorities wish to search a suspect's apartment for stolen machine guns.
Before a warrant will issue, the authorities must describe the apart-
ment, detail why they have probable cause to link the apartment to
44 Id. at 87. In reviewing the SEC's action after remand, the Court later ex-
plained that
a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety
of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds
are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administra-
tive action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper
basis.
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I1), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
45 Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). Post
hoc rationalizations, therefore, are not generally considered. Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Deukmejian v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984). A rationale articulated by agency counsel
in litigation may not reflect the agency's view, may have been hastily developed with
an eye only toward prevailing in the litigation, and may not have been subject to the
input of parties in either a rulemaking or adjudication. Cf FLRA v. U.S. Dep't of
Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[A] position established only in
litigation may have been developed hastily, or under special pressure, or without an
adequate opportunity for presentation of conflicting views.").
46 Other examples exist in which governmental entities must, prior to acting, cre-
ate a type of record. Such instances range from preclearance for changes under the
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000), to required notice and a limited hear-
ing before cutting off benefit entitlements, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264
(1970).
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the stolen machine guns, and then describe the guns with some detail.
If the authorities, armed with a warrant, then search the apartment
and seize counterfeit Hermes scarves from a desk drawer, the fruits of
the search almost assuredly will be suppressed. Unless the authorities
had some reason to stumble upon the scarves in the midst of search-
ing for the machine guns, they cannot use the scarves to launch a new
investigation of the defendant. Indeed, the defendant may be able to
sue the officers under the Fourth Amendment, claiming that the
seizure of the scarves, given that it was not supported by any cause
whatsoever, violated the suspect's right to be secure in his or her
effects.
The continuity requirement is vital to constrain the discretion of
law enforcement officials. In the absence of the requirement, officials
could have testified after the search that they had intended at the out-
set to look for counterfeit scarves. They could have constructed rea-
sons why probable cause existed to believe that the defendant dealt in
counterfeit goods, and the presence of the scarves would itself be tes-
tament to the probity of their suspicions. Moreover, without the prior
writing, there would be less information against which to assess the
authorities' testimony. Of course, the officers can still lie about where
they found the scarves, but the requirement of ex ante writing limits
the potential for abuse.
C. Supreme Court Doctrine Recognizing the Continuity Principle
Law enforcement authorities today, however, rely much less fre-
quently upon warrants than in years past. In the last forty years, the
Supreme Court has permitted warrantless searches and seizures in a
wide variety of contexts. In the absence of warrants, the continuity
requirement becomes more difficult to enforce even as it becomes
more important to recognize.
The critical case revamping the constitutional terrain is Terry v.
Ohio.4 7 In Tery, the Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of
brief, warrantless seizures carried out by law enforcement authorities
to investigate suspicious activity. In doing so, the Court emphasized
the need to remain faithful to the principles girding the warrant re-
quirement. The Terry Court stressed that "the notions which underlie
both the warrant procedure and the requirement of probable cause
remain fully relevant."48
In setting a structure to constrain law enforcement officials, the
Court in Terry provided that a seizure "must be 'strictly tied to and
47 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
48 Id. at 20.
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justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissi-
ble," 49 and "the investigative methods employed should be the least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's
suspicion in a short period of time." 50 The Court in Terry in effect
applied the principle of continuity that underlies the warrant require-
ment to ensure that such stops were confined to the legitimating
objectives. Moreover, the Court explained that "[t] he Fourth Amend-
ment proceeds as much by limitations upon the scope of governmen-
tal action as by imposing preconditions upon its initiation."51 Teny
therefore starkly rejects any notion of using such stops to launch fish-
ing expeditions. Rather, the seizure must be "reasonably related in
scope to the justification" for the seizure's initiation.
5 2
1. Limitation on Searches
Although not conceptualized as such, the Supreme Court has
struck down a variety of searches in which the continuity principle was
breached. In Arizona v. Hicks,53 when police officers entered an apart-
ment in response to a shooting, one of the officers noticed some ex-
pensive stereo equipment.54  The officer suspected that the
equipment was stolen and moved the stereos a few inches to read the
serial numbers.5 5 The Court held that, although exigent circum-
stances permitted the officers to enter the apartment-obviating the
need for a warrant-by moving the stereos to read the serial numbers,
the officer conducted a new search that was unrelated to the objec-
tives of the authorized intrusion. 56 Despite the fact that the officers
were already lawfully in the apartment and that the stereos were in
plain view, the intrusion was "unjustified by the exigent circumstances
that validated the entry."57 In a memorable turn of phrase, the Court
summarized that "[a] search is a search, even if it happens to disclose
nothing but the bottom of a turntable." 58 Reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment requires that searches be justified by reference to
49 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (quoting Teny, 392 U.S. at 19).
50 Id.
51 Terry, 392 U.S. at 28-29.
52 Id. at 29. The Supreme Court in Caballes apparently read the scope limitations
out of the Terry test. See Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 834 (2005).
53 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
54 Id. at 323.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 324-25.
57 Id. at 325.
58 Id; see also United States v.Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the authorities violated the Fourth Amendment when they continued searching a
[VOL. 8 1: 1
THE CONTINUITY PRINCIPLE
the rationales that legitimated them-any expansion not justified by
the plain view doctrine 59 had to be independently justified under the
Fourth Amendment.
On the one hand, the result in Hicks may strike many as silly. If
the stereo equipment had been lying on its side, then the numbers
would have been in plain view. Moreover, once the enforcement offi-
cials were lawfully in the apartment, the suspect enjoyed only marginal
additional privacy interest in being secure from the officers' addi-
tional intrusion in flipping over the turntable. Turning over the turn-
table to record the serial numbers seems reasonable in light of the
limited privacy interest at stake. Yet, if the Fourth Amendment is
viewed in part as a restraint on enforcement officials' overreaching, as
the history suggests, the result in Hicks is much more understandable.
Law enforcement officials should not have the incentive to parlay one
search into another, nor the incentive to obtain justification for one
search so as to permit an extended or second search for a different
purpose. The continuity principle in the Warrant Clause reflects the
long-held belief that privacy is protected by blunting law enforcement
officials' incentive to conduct wide-ranging searches untethered to
objectives justifying the initial search. As Justice Stevens commented
in Texas v. Brown,60 the Court "has been sensitive to the danger ...
that officers will enlarge a specific authorization, furnished by a war-
rant or an exigency, into the equivalent of a general warrant to rum-
mage and seize at will."6 1
The Court applied the continuity principle articulated in Hicks to
limit a search in Minnesota v. Dickerson.62 There, an individual leaving
a building that law enforcement officers considered a notorious crack
house changed directions and walked away from the officers once he
saw them. The officers made an investigatory Terry stop-not needing
a warrant-and conducted a brief frisk for weapons. Although the
examining officer did not find any weapons, he did feel in a jacket
pocket what turned out to be a package of cocaine, which he seized.63
The Supreme Court held that, although the officer was justified in
package even though a drug sniffing dog failed to alert on the package, hence negat-
ing the arguable probable cause that existed previously for the search).
59 See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
60 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
61 Id. at 748 (Stevens,J., concurring). The Court permitted law enforcement au-
thorities in that case to seize from a motorist a balloon that was in plain view when
they had reason to connect the balloon to the drug trade. Id. at 739-40 (majority
opinion).
62 508 U.S. 366, 371 (1993).
63 Id. at 369.
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conducting the brief frisk for weapons, "the officer's continued explo-
ration of respondent's pocket after having concluded that it con-
tained no weapon was unrelated to '[t]he sole justification of the
search.' ",64 According to the Court, Teny stops must be "strictly 'lim-
ited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which
might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.' "65 Because the
search and ultimate seizure were unrelated to the original stop, the
Court held that the seizure was unconstitutional.
66
As with the search in Hicks, it may seem a small step from a legiti-
mate pat for weapons to investigate an object that, though not a
weapon, was suspicious. A short examination of that object may ap-
pear to be reasonable. But, viewed through the prism of administra-
tive restraint, the continued exploration of the jacket pocket's
contents exceeded the scope of the search that had been justified by
the original frisk for weapons. In the absence of such limit, enforce-
ment authorities could transform a limited Tery search into a full-
fledged search of an individual, and that would afford authorities too
much discretionary authority, as in the days of general warrants or
writs of assistance.
67
Even when law enforcement authorities can enter homes or of-
fices to arrest individuals, they cannot then switch objectives once
there to search the premises. Law enforcement authorities must stick
to the objective justifying their presence in the home or office. In
Chimel v. California,68 in demarcating the doctrine of searches incident
to arrest, the Court noted that "simply because some interference with
an individual's privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken
place [is no reason why] further intrusion should automatically be al-
lowed despite the absence of a warrant that the Fourth Amendment
64 Id at 378 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
65 Id. at 373 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968)).
66 Id. at 378-79.
67 Similarly, in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978), the Court held
that the legitimacy of law enforcement authorities' presence in an apartment did not
permit a wider search for evidence. An undercover police officer entered an apart-
ment to conclude a drug sale and was shot. Backup quickly entered, subdued individ-
uals in the apartment, and then called for help. Homicide detectives arrived ten
minutes later and proceeded to gather evidence over the next four days, searching
the entire apartment and inventorying all of the contents. Id. at 387-89. Although
the officers' initial presence in the apartment was legitimate, the Court ruled that the
subsequent search was not. Id. at 392-93. The extended search could only have been
justified with a new warrant: "And a four-day search that included opening dresser
drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate
concerns that justify an emergency search." Id. at 393.
68 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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would otherwise require."69 And, in Maryland v. Buie70 the Court held
that a protective sweep after an in-home arrest did notjustify any addi-
tional search-"once [the suspect] was found, however, the search for
him was over, and there was no longer that particular justification for
entering any room that had not yet been searched. ' 7 1 Searches inci-
dent to arrest must therefore be circumscribed to prevent a general
search of the premises.
72
This is not to suggest that the history leading up to ratification of
the Fourth Amendment convincingly demonstrates that law enforce-
ment authorities must today be held to the objectives that justified
bypassing the warrant requirement.73 The Amendment, after all, was
crafted in an era when there was no police force, little organized
crime, and technology meant something very different. Thus, it
would be impossible to apply the Framers' design exactly as they
would have intended today given the very different social reality
within which we live. Nonetheless, the underlying concern for cabin-
ing the authority of low-level enforcement officials should be as salient
today as it was in the time of the Framing. Indeed, the continuity
requirement is even more important given the many exceptions to the
warrant requirement that the Supreme Court has recognized.
In short, the Court has recognized the principle of continuity in a
variety of search settings even if it has not persuasively justified its
holdings with reference to the Fourth Amendment history or contem-
porary policy concerns. Searches and any expansion must be legiti-
mated by reference to the objectives underlying the original search.
When warrants are not applicable, the legitimacy of searches must be
assessed by the rationales justifying the warrantless search. As the
Court summarized in Horton v. California,74 "a warrantless search
[must] be circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation.
'75
69 Id. at 767 n.12. The Court has expanded the search incident to arrest excep-
tion, but not obliterated it. See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
70 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
71 Id. at 333.
72 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (holding that search incident to arrest did not
justify search of entire residence).
73 The historical evidence is not without ambiguity. Evidently, searches incident
to arrest were widely accepted even while searches without a warrant into the home
were strictly prohibited. See Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Au-
thority To Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 381 (2001).
74 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
75 Id. at 139-40.
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Lower courts, however, have not always been hospitable to this
line of cases. While paying lip service to Hicks and Dickerson, a num-
ber of courts have adopted such relaxed standards as to sap the con-
tinuity principle of much of its vitality. For instance, in People v.
Custer76 law enforcement authorities arrested an individual for pos-
sessing marijuana and then proceeded to pat down his companion,
Custer, to ensure their safety.77 The investigating officer removed
what he thought from the pat down search to be blotter acid from
Custer's pocket and set it on the roof of the car. The officer found no
weapons. When he later picked up the object, he saw that they were
photographs, turned them over, and noted what appeared to be mari-
juana plants in the pictures. 78 The information contained in the pic-
tures led to incriminating evidence. The Michigan Supreme Court
upheld the search of the pocket's contents first on the theory that the
officer had probable cause to believe that the cardboard-type sub-
stance was contraband.79 Quite a stretch. It is difficult to believe that
an officer patting down an individual's pants could, by feel, determine
that an object was blotter paper as opposed to, say, a piece of card-
board. And, there was no reason to link Custer to acid at all. Then,
the court held that the officer had justification to turn over the photos
after he realized his mistake on the ground that Custer had a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy in the photos once they had lawfully been
seized by the officer. 80 That reasoning is nonsense. If an officer
picked up a diary and realized it had no relevance to the ongoing
investigation, he or she could not then leaf through its contents; nor
should the seizure of a video authorize enforcement officials to view it
once they realize that the video is irrelevant to the investigation. The
same should be true with the back of a photograph.
Custer is not an aberration. In State v. Wonders8I the Kansas Su-
preme Court upheld a search in which a car had been stopped for
failing to use a turn indicator. The officer asked the passengers to
exit the car, and the subsequent search of the car revealed drug para-
phernalia. The officer next decided to pat down the passengers and,
although he did not find any weapons, he testified that, from the
"feel" of a bulge in a pant's pocket, he had probable cause to identify
the bulge as marijuana. 82 During the suppression motion, the officer
76 630 N.W.2d 870 (Mich. 2001).
77 Id. at 874.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 878-79.
80 Id. at 881-82.
81 952 P.2d 1351 (Kan. 1998).
82 Id. at 1354-55.
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testified that baggies of marijuana had a consistent feel to them that
he could not put into words.8 3 The Court credited the trial court's
determination that the officer had sufficient reason to believe that the
bulge was marijuana. And, in State v. Craven8 4 the suspect had been
riding a motorcycle without a helmet, and his cycle had no license
plate. The officers conducted a pat down search, even though they
had no reason to think the driver posed a danger, other than perhaps
to himself for failing to wear the helmet. The investigating officer
alighted upon something metallic that he asserted felt like a mari-
juana pipe, which is illegal to possess under Nebraska law.8 5 The item
turned out to be a spark plug, but the officer discovered some crack
cocaine in the process of pulling the spark plug out of the motorcy-
clist's pocket.8 6 The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the of-
ficer had probable cause to believe that the item was in fact a
marijuana pipe.
87
Squaring these lower court cases with Dickerson and Hicks is al-
most impossible. Only by dint of heroic faith in a police officer's abili-
ties can one assume that the pat down of pants in Wonders could be so
discerning, and the proffered rationale justifying examination of the
photographs in Custer is ludicrous. The reluctance to follow the rele-
vant Supreme Court precedent may stem from antipathy toward the
exclusionary rule. These courts would not be the first to skew facts to
prevent obviously guilty defendants from going free. But, the reluc-
tance might also arise from the Supreme Court's seeming arbitrary
linedrawing. The courts may not have perceived the continuity princi-
ple underlying Hicks and Dickerson, nor the advantages of strict
application.
2. Limitation on Seizures
The principle of continuity also applies in the context of pro-
tracted seizures. Law enforcement authorities cannot extend deten-
tion for reasons unrelated to the underlying justification for the
seizure, unless new grounds arise that independently justify continued
detention.
Consider United States v. Babwah.88 There, customs officers had
been conducting surveillance as part of an investigation into money
83 Id. at 1355.
84 571 N.W.2d 612 (Neb. 1997).
85 Id. at 615-16.
86 Id. at 616.
87 Id. at 620.
88 972 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1992).
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laundering. They followed suspects to a bank and then later stopped
their car when it appeared they were heading for the airport with lug-
gage in tow. The court found that this initial stop was valid, for they
had reasonable grounds to believe that the luggage contained cur-
rency connected to the money laundering investigation.8 9 After they
searched the luggage and found nothing incriminatory, however, the
officers continued to question the passengers and directed that they
accompany the officers back to the motorists' residence.90 According
to the court, the seizure should have ended once their suspicion
about the luggage was satisfied. After the officers learned that their
reasonable suspicion was unfounded, they should have released the
suspects. 91 A seizure cannot extend beyond fulfilling the objectives
legitimating the initial deprivation of freedom. 92 Continued deten-
tion is tantamount to a new seizure that can only be justified by proba-
ble cause or, in some contexts, reasonable suspicion of unlawful
activity.
Consider, as well, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Simmons v. City of
Paris.93 There, law enforcement authorities executed a "no knock"
warrant on the wrong home, briefly detaining the occupants. The in-
habitants sued the officers, alleging that the officers remained in the
house for five to six minutes after they realized their mistake and con-
tinued detaining the inhabitants as they looked around the prem-
ises. 94 The Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of
89 Id. at 33.
90 Id. at 32.
91 Id. at 33. Or, for that matter, neither can law enforcement officials prolong a
Teny stop to force the suspect to participate in a lineup at the station house. That
would transform a Terry stop into a full-fledged arrest. Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205,
224 (D.C. 1971).
92 Similarly, courts have recognized that law enforcement authorities must return
items seized during an investigation once their evidentiary utility has ceased. As the
court noted in United States v. Wilson, 540 F.2d. 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
"[i]f the seizure is for evidentiary purposes of things innocent in themselves,
as for example an identifying garment or incriminating records, the lawful-
ness of the seizure goes only to the question of when they should be re-
turned; when their evidentiary utility is exhausted, the owner should have
back his overcoat or his business ledger."
Id. at 1103 n.4 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 280.3
(1975)). And, in United States v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 1999), the court
stated that "[ i t is well settled that the government is permitted to seize evidence for
use in investigation and trial, but that such property must be returned once criminal
proceedings have concluded, unless it is contraband or subject to forfeiture." Id. at
376.
93 378 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2004).
94 Id. at 480.
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defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that, once
the officers realized the mistake, they had to "immediately terminate
their search" and release the inhabitants. 9 5 The termination of the
search and seizure must be "immediate." Five to six extra minutes will
not do. 9
6
Just as law enforcement authorities must immediately release in-
habitants of a home once their mistake is known, so they presumably
must release a suspect after a mistaken arrest. If law enforcement au-
thorities arrest an individual without a warrant, they must release that
individual unless they provide expeditiously for a probable cause de-
termination by a neutral judicial official. For instance, if law enforce-
ment officials detain a suspect on suspicion of robbery, they cannot
prolong the detention after they have satisfied themselves that the
robbery allegation is baseless to investigate whether the individual
might be a drug dealer.
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,9 7 the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether law enforcement authorities could delay bringing an ar-
restee before a neutral magistrate for charging. According to the
Court, too much delay would violate the Fourth Amendment. The
majority emphasized that "[e]xamples of unreasonable delay are de-
lays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the ar-
rest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or
delay for delay's sake."98 Justice Scalia in dissent echoed the major-
ity's view, stating that there is "no room for intentional delay unrelated
to the completion of 'the administrative steps incident to arrest."' 99
Law enforcement authorities cannot seize individuals for one purpose
and then extend the seizure for an unrelated objective.100
95 Id. at 479-80. Both the search and seizure were extended, and the Fifth Cir-
cuit did not suggest that the protracted searching should be analyzed any differently
from the prolonged seizure.
96 See also Pray v. City of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154 (6th Cir. 1995) (rejecting de-
fense of qualified immunity when law enforcement authorities allegedly failed to
leave a premises four to five minutes after realizing their mistake).
97 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
98 Id. at 56.
99 Id. at 63 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
100 See also United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 510 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(stating that, "after the computer checks came up clean, there remained no reasona-
ble suspicion of wrongdoing by the vehicle occupants. Continued questioning there-
after unconstitutionally prolonged the detentions"); United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d
1102 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that an officer cannot prolong a traffic stop to permit
a canine sniff or to conduct a criminal background check once the police had already
decided to give a warning ticket); United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 541 (6th
Cir. 2002) (holding that a motorist cannot be detained any longer than is reasonably
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As in cases challenging the scope of warranfless searches, some
lower courts have desisted from the logic of Hicks and Dickerson. For
instance, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. $404,905 in U.S. Cur-
rency0 conceded that there had been a delay in walking a drug snif-
fing dog around a stopped vehicle, in that case a U-Haul trailer. The
motorist had been stopped for a routine traffic offense. The court,
however, refused to force law enforcement authorities to release the
motorist when the underlying investigation had become complete.
The court focused on the fact that the drug sniff itself was not prob-
lematic from a Fourth Amendment perspective, as the Supreme Court
was later to hold in Caballes. It noted that, if the drug sniff had taken
place contemporaneously with the writing of the ticket, then there
would be no Fourth Amendment offense:
[I]f Officer Ward had been working with a partner who carried out
the canine sniff while Ward completed the traffic checks, or if [the
canine] had been trained to do the sniff by himself while Ward
completed those checks, the sniff would have occurred on the traf-
fic stop side of our Fourth Amendment line.
10 2
The short delay past that line was of little moment to the court. Thus,
according to the court, prolonging the seizure would only infringe
marginally on the liberty of motorists. Particularly given the "strong
interest in interdicting the flow of illegal drugs along the nation's
highways," "a two-minute canine sniff was a de minimis intrusion on...
personal liberty."103 The court simply ignored the salience of the con-
tinuity principle followed in Hicks and Dickerson, as well as in Babwah
and Simmons.
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Childs104 refused to draw a
line at all to limit the duration of a seizure. The en banc court termed
the seizure of a motorist an arrest, and then reasoned that the only
constraint on the duration of an arrest was one of general reasonable-
necessary to issue a traffic citation unless there is reasonable suspicion of a separate
offense); United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d 719, 724 (9th Cir. 2001) (hold-
ing that detention cannot be extended for reasons other than those justifying the
original stop in the absence of reasonable suspicion of a separate offense); United
States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that once the purpose
justifying the stop is completed, the detention is unlawful unless there is suspicion of
another crime); Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 491 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that once
the writing of a speeding citation had concluded, no further legitimate reason existed
for detention).
101 182 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1999).
102 Id. at 649.
103 Id.
104 277 F.3d 947, 953 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
[VOL. 8 1: 1
THE CONTINUITY PRINCIPLE
ness. 10 5 To the court, the key factor was that, for most traffic stops,
law enforcement authorities have probable cause to make the stop,
and motorists can be arrested for routine offenses and even hauled off
to the station for booking.10 6 In that eventuality, police would have
more than enough time to search the entire car for contraband, let
alone undertake a dog sniff.10 7 Under the court's reasoning, law en-
forcement authorities could require motorists stopped for routine
traffic stops to wait an additional fifteen minutes, half hour, or even
more than an hour to permit officers to conduct unrelated criminal
investigations based on nothing more than instinct. Underlying the
decision is the premise that no comparable constraints as in Tery ap-
ply to cabin the duration and scope of a seizure when law enforce-
ment authorities are armed with probable cause.
The presence of probable cause by itself, however, should not be
determinative. In the search context, if there is probable cause to be-
lieve that a suspect has a stolen sculpture in his apartment, police
must still stop the search once the sculpture has been located as speci-
fied in the warrant. And, the Supreme Court so held in Maryland v.
Buie.'0 8 As in the search context, the presence of probable cause to
seize an individual should not permit law enforcement authorities to
continue detention once the underlying purpose of the seizure has
been satisfied. The Fifth Circuit so held in Simmons, reasoning that
the probable (though mistaken) cause to seize the occupants did not
justify prolonging the seizure by even a couple of minutes after the
error was realized.'0 9 Indeed, the Court on several occasions has in-
quired as to the legitimacy of police measures such as protective
searches after a routine traffic stop," 0 which suggests that the pres-
ence of probable cause does not remove motorists' rights to a limited
stop congruent with the purpose justifying the seizure. Similarly, au-
105 Id. at 956.
106 Id. (discussing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)).
107 In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the Court sanctioned war-
rantless police inventory searches of impounded vehicles as justified by the need of
police to safeguard property, protect themselves from liability, and protect themselves
from danger. Id. at 369. The scope of the inventory search in the case extended to
everything in plain sight in the car, as well as the contents of the unlocked glove box.
Id. at 376 n.10. Justice Powell in his concurrence noted in discussing the absence of a
warrant that it is particularly important that "no significant discretion is placed in the
hands of the individual officer: he usually has no choice as to the subject of the search
or its scope." Id. at 384 (Powell, J., concurring).
108 494 U.S. 325, 333 (1990).
109 Simmons v. City of Paris, 378 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2004).
110 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977).
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thorities should not use the occasion of a jaywalking violation to de-
tain the pedestrian further to launch a drug or other investigation.
Moreover, the theoretical authority to arrest a motorist does not
justify the extended detention. In Knowles v. Iowa,"' for example, the
Supreme Court invalidated a search of a car after a routine traffic
stop. The Court stressed that, even if the same evidence could have
been uncovered after an inventory search had the driver been ar-
rested and taken to the station, the fact that the driver was not ar-
rested was dispositive.'1 2 The Court assessed the validity of the search
based on what the troopers did, not on what they could have done.
11 3
Nor could the search be justified in Knowles on the ground that law
enforcement authorities needed to preserve evidence: "No further evi-
dence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person
of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car."114 The
power to arrest a motorist for a routine traffic offense should not
trump the continuity principle.
Some might question why the greater power to arrest should not
include the lesser to detain. Indeed, if courts enforced the continuity
principle, law enforcement authorities might respond by arresting all
motorists committing routine traffic offenses. There are at least three
considerations that would make such a scenario far-fetched. First, en-
forcement officials' resources are too limited to permit diverting their
energies to accompany motorists back to the station house and then
to fill out the necessary paperwork.'1 5 Second, as a strategic matter,
enforcement authorities would be loathe to arrest for fear of trigger-
ing Miranda.1" 6 The Supreme Court adverted to that reality in
Berkemer v. McCarty1 7 in holding that Miranda does not attach upon a
routine traffic stop because such seizures more closely resemble stops
under Terry rather than a custodial arrest. 1 8 Officials depend heavily
on questioning in attempting to determine whether the motorists
stopped for a routine offense are guilty of something else. Finally, as
111 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
112 Id. at 117.
113 Id. 118.
114 Id; see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (declining to assess reason-
ableness of search based on fact that defendant could have been arrested, but was
not).
115 Some officials might arrest motorists and keep them in their squad cars, search
a car completely, and release the motorist if nothing untoward was uncovered.
Whether courts would permit such use of arrests is unclear, but even that law enforce-
ment path would consume more resources.
116 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
117 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
118 Id. at 441-42.
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will be discussed later,119 there may well be political repercussions
from arresting generally law-abiding cidzens for routine traffic of-
fenses (or jaywalking), as may have occurred in Atwater.120 Thus, the
presence of probable cause does not negate the Terry Court's stress on
protections analogous to those in the Warrant Clause.
Under Terry, once the justification for seizures ceases, further de-
tention violates a core precept of the Fourth Amendment. When war-
rants are not practical, administrative constraints become even more
important to cabin the swath of the search and the duration of the
seizure. The continuity requirement helps ensure that law enforce-
ment officials cannot widen deprivations of liberty by using the occa-
sion of a lawful detention or search to investigate other crimes. At the
same time, strict application of the principle deters law enforcement
authorities from detaining individuals or launching searches for
pretextual reasons. The decisions in Hicks and Dickerson recognize a
far more important principle than many lower courts have been will-
ing to recognize.
II. THE CONTIUITY PRINCIPLE IN CABALLES, MUEHLER, AND ALFORD
A. Caballes
In Illinois v. Caballes,12 1 Illinois State Police Trooper Daniel Gil-
lette stopped Roy Caballes for driving seventy-one miles per hour on a
portion of the interstate highway where the speed limit was sixty-five
miles per hour.122 The trooper instructed Caballes to move his car
farther out of the way of traffic, asked Caballes to sit in the squad car,
and informed him that he was only going to issue a warning ticket.
119 See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
120 532 U.S. 318 (2001). The City of Lago Vista stood by the actions of Officer
Turek, who made the arrest, even though Turek no longer works for the City of Lago
Vista. Soon after the arrest, he left to work in a neighboring county. Lago Vista con-
tended that his career change was unrelated to the Atwater case. Lisa Ruddy, Note,
From Seatbelts to Handcuffs: May Police Arrest for Minor Traffic Violations, 10 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 479, 484 (2002) (citing Susan Borreson, Officer Immune from
Suit for Seatbelt Arrest, 15 TEx. LAw. 38 (1999)). There has been judicial criticism. See
State v. Jones, 796 N.E.2d 989, 994-95 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the Ohio
Supreme Court case relying on Atwater was not controlling because the appellate
court predicted that the Ohio Supreme Court would interpret state constitutional
protections to prohibit arrests for minor misdemeanors); State v. Brown, No. 18972,
2001 WL 1657828 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2001) (stating that if it were at liberty to do
so it would reject the precedent from Atwater in the situation at hand).
121 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
122 Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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The trooper called a police dispatcher to determine whether Caballes'
driver's license was valid, and to check for outstanding warrants.
123
While waiting for results of the check, Trooper Gillette queried
Caballes about his destination and his business attire. Gillette soon
received word that Caballes' driver's license was valid. Trooper Gil-
lette next requested the dispatcher to determine whether there was
any criminal background information linked to the motorist. Subse-
quently, the trooper asked Caballes for permission to search his vehi-
cle. Caballes refused. Trooper Gillette asked whether Caballes had
ever been arrested, and Caballes answered that he had not. The dis-
patcher reported that Caballes had two prior arrests for distribution of
marijuana. Trooper Gillette testified that he had still not completed
writing the warning ticket for speeding when another police officer
arrived with a drug-detection dog. The second trooper walked the
drug-detection dog around Caballes' car, and the dog alerted to the
trunk. The troopers searched the trunk of the car and found mari-
juana. Caballes was arrested and charged with one count of cannabis
trafficking. 1
24
At trial, Caballes moved to suppress the drug evidence found in
the trunk of his car. The trial court queried whether the officers
"have a right to ask for criminal history? Probably not."' 25 Moreover,
the court noted that writing a warning ticket should not have taken
more than a minute. 126 Nonetheless, the court held that the three to
six minute delay did not invalidate the seizure.' 27 After a bench trial,
the court found Caballes guilty. 128 Caballes appealed the trial court's
decision not to suppress the evidence, and the Illinois Appellate Court
affirmed. The appellate court also noted the delay from use of the
drug-detection dog (though not from the background check), but
held that the minute or two delay in walking the dog around the car
was de minimis. 129
The Illinois Supreme Court overturned that decision, holding
that the behavior of the state troopers in expanding the scope of the
traffic stop was unreasonable under the standards articulated in
123 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. at 2a, Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834
(No. 03-923), 2003 WL 23119168.
124 Id. at 3a.
125 Id. at 23a.
126 Id. at 24a.
127 Id. at 23a.
128 Id. at 3a.
129 Id. at 17a.
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Tery.130 According to the court, the troopers had "nothing more
than a vague hunch that defendant may have been involved in possi-
ble wrongdoing,"' 3'1 and "a canine sniff was performed without 'spe-
cific and articulable facts' to support its use, unjustifiably enlarging
the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation. '" 132 Ac-
cordingly, the court directed that the contraband be suppressed.
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court held that a dog
sniff does not reveal any legitimate private information because the
sniff only can indicate the presence of contraband: "Any intrusion on
respondent's privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a consti-
tutionally cognizable infringement."' 3 3 It further explained that a
"dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that
reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no
individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment."' 3 4 Accordingly, the Court vacated the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision.
The Court, however, never discussed whether the law enforce-
ment officers prolonged the seizure of Caballes to conduct the crimi-
nal background check and dog sniff.135 Instead, the Court stated that
the [state court] judges carefully reviewed the details of Officer Gil-
lette's conversations with respondent and the precise timing of his
radio transmissions to the dispatcher to determine whether he had
improperly extended the duration of the stop to enable the dog
sniff to occur .... [W]e accept the state court's conclusion that the
duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic
offense. 136
Caballes himself did not raise the protracted duration argument in his
brief, suggesting only that, should his challenge to the dog sniff fail, it
would be for the Illinois Supreme Court to consider whether the dura-
tion of the seizure had been impermissibly prolonged.
137




133 Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 838.
134 Id.
135 As Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent, the majority ignored as well the very
thrust of Tery, which imposed scope limitations on all warrantless searches and
seizures. Id. at 844--46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 837 (majority opinion).
137 Brief for the Respondent at 34 n.12, Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834 (No. 03-923), 2004
WL 2097415.
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The record, however, strongly suggests delay. 138 After stopping
Caballes, Trooper Gillette immediately informed him that he would
only receive a warning ticket. Trooper Gillette then awaited the out-
come of the driver's license check to determine whether there were
any outstanding warrants. But, even after finding that Caballes had a
valid driver's license and that no warrants were outstanding, the inves-
tigation continued. At this point, the investigation had taken five min-
utes, and no reason relating to the traffic violation existed for any
further continuation.
Trooper Gillette subsequently requested Caballes' criminal his-
tory from the dispatcher. While Trooper Gillette was waiting, he
asked whether he could search Caballes' car. Caballes declined.
Trooper Gillette then asked whether Caballes had ever been arrested.
Only afterwards did Trooper Gillette begin to write the warning ticket.
Before he completed the ticket, Trooper Graham arrived with the
drug-detection dog, which then walked around Caballes' car, causing
another short delay. 139 Although the overall delay engendered by the
criminal background check, unrelated questioning, and the dog sniff
may have only taken three or four minutes-the record is unclear-
the fact that the seizure was prolonged is inescapable. Indeed, almost
the entire duration of the encounter concerned investigating Trooper
Gillette's hunch of criminal wrongdoing because the decision to write
the warning ticket was made in the first minute. At a minimum, once
the trooper learned that Caballes had a Valid driver's license and no
warrants were outstanding, the rest of the encounter, at least one-
third of it, was focused on the possibility of uncovering unrelated crimi-
nal activity of which he had no reasonable suspicion.
140
The trial court adverted to the delay, and noted that the warning
ticket should have been completed much earlier in the encounter.
141
138 Caballes unquestionably was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-37 (1984) (stating that the Court
has "long acknowledged that 'stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendmen [t], even though
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief" (quoting
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (alterations in original))).
139 For the Court's description of Caballes' detention, see 125 S. Ct. at 836.
140 The United States argued in its brief in Caballes that, even if there had been
delay, only when a search is "'conducted in an extraordinary manner,'" such as
through use of deadly force, or it is effected after an unannounced entry into a home,
would it become unreasonable due to the presence of probable cause for the traffic
stop. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Cabal-
les, 125 S. Ct. 834 (No. 03-923), 2004 WL 1530263 (quoting Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996)).
141 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 123, at 24a.
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Nonetheless, for reasons not clearly articulated, the court rejected the
Fourth Amendment challenge to duration. The appellate court simi-
larly noted the delay, at least that attributable to the dog sniff but, like
the Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. $404,905 in U.S. Cur-
rency,14 2 termed the delay de minimis. 143 The Illinois Supreme Court
did not assess the duration argument directly but noted that the law
enforcement officials lacked justification for "further detaining the
defendant."' 44 Accordingly, it is not clear what the United States Su-
preme Court meant by "we accept the state court's conclusion that the
duration of the stop in this case was entirely justified by the traffic
offense,"'145 given that none of the state courts made such a holding
explicitly, and the Illinois Supreme Court never so much as intimated
that conclusion.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court previously held that
even brief detentions in the absence of reasonable suspicion are anti-
thetical to the Fourth Amendment. For instance, the Court struck
down short seizures in both United States v. Brignoni-Ponce14 6 and City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond1 47 despite the strong law enforcement interest
in corralling illegal immigration in the first case and drug use in the
second. An individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures dictated that the even relatively short seizures-one min-
ute in Brignoni-Ponce and up to five minutes in Edmond-be
invalidated.
The only difference in this case is that Caballes initially was law-
fully detained because Trooper Gillette clocked him exceeding the
speed limit by six miles per hour. Once the justification for the
seizure lapsed, however, Caballes should have been in the same situa-
tion as the defendants in Brignoni-Ponce and Edmond-no further
seizure should have been permitted absent reasonable suspicion of a
separate offense. The prolongation in this case exceeded the length
of the entire seizure in Brignoni-Ponce.148 As in Childs, probable cause
142 182 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1999).
143 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 123, at 17a.
144 People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 205 (I11. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 834.
145 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837.
146 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
147 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
148 Although the United States in its amicus brief argued that there was no delay,
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 140, at
19-20, it had previously noted, "after the purposes of a traffic detention are ful-
filled.... any further questioning must be consensual or justified by reasonable suspi-
cion, because lengthening a non-consensual detention increases the 'seizure.'"
Supplemental Brief for the Appellant on Rehearing En Banc at 15, United States v.
Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-7150) (en banc).
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existed for the stop. Yet, as discussed before, the unexercised power
to arrest does not bring with it the power to detain at will for unre-
lated reasons. An individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures demands that the duration of the seizure be tied
to the reasons justifying the initial exercise of governmental coercion.
Thus, the continuity principle should require invalidating the dog
sniff of the car-once the purpose of the original seizure had been
satisfied, the motorist should have been free to leave.
Despite its less than candid description of the facts, the Supreme
Court articulated a test in Caballes that seems similar to that espoused
in this Article. It stated that "[a] seizure that is justified solely by the
interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful
if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete
the mission."' 49 The question is what "reasonably required" means. If
it connotes a general reasonableness test to determine whether the
officials acted reasonably under the circumstances, then very few con-
straints remain. 150 Many believed the searches in Hicks and Dickerson
reasonable under the circumstances as well. And, the several minute
delay in Simmons after the law enforcement authorities realized their
mistake in detaining the occupants also could be considered reasona-
ble. The gravamen of those decisions rather is that no continued
searching or detention is permissible, whether it appears reasonable
or not under the circumstances, after the purpose for the underlying
search or seizure has been satisfied. In other words, once the objec-
tive underlying the stop has been fulfilled, continued detention must
be viewed as a new seizure that can only be justified independently.
In many cases, it may not be clear whether the law enforcement
authorities extended the seizure to pursue an unrelated investigation.
Troopers might stall when writing a warning ticket, take extra long in
discussions with dispatch, or prolong questioning concerning the
identity of individuals in a car. Or, they may investigate unrelated
crimes while awaiting results from a driver's license check, making it
difficult to separate one investigation from another. Thus, there will
be a number of cases in which courts must struggle with determining
whether the purpose justifying the initial seizure had been satisfied by
the time that law enforcement authorities discover the incriminating
information. Courts must develop tests, based on objective evidence,
149 Caballes, 125 S. Ct. at 837.
150 And, some evidence of the United States Supreme Court's view on the matter
can be seen by its curious statement that the Illinois courts found no delay in the case.
Id.
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to assess at what point the purpose of the original seizure had been
satisfied.
For one possible approach, courts could determine whether a
seizure has been improperly prolonged based on what investigative
measures the law enforcement officials have in fact pursued. In other
words, courts might hold that the seizure lasts too long if law enforce-
ment authorities engage in a series of measures unrelated to the inves-
tigation justifying the initial seizure. The more unrelated investigative
measures undertaken, the more likely that the duration has increased.
The amount of investigative activity unrelated to the investigation jus-
tifying the search or seizure may stand as a proxy for duration in those
cases in which the record is not clear.
Of course, if the authorities had been driving with a drug sniffing
canine in Caballes, no delay would have existed, and the sniff would
have been entirely appropriate. 151 Similarly, law enforcement author-
ities might have the incentive to develop electronic drug sniffing cen-
sors, which would be unproblematic from a continuity perspective.
Those consequences may not be as anomalous as they may seem. The
continuity principle does not immunize motorists from dog sniffs,
background checks, or questioning; it rather requires only that the
seizure not be extended to pursue unrelated investigations. The strict
restrictions on the duration of a seizure and the scope of a search
reflect a critical strategy to cabin searches and seizures, particularly
those that are not preceded by a warrant. Warrantless encounters
with police increase the risk of misconduct, and the continuity re-
quirement mimics the protections of the Warrant Clause.
Moreover, even though the linedrawing between purposes re-
lated and unrelated to the initial stop may seem to some arbitrary,
sound considerations of policy support confining a seizure during a
routine'traffic stop to the time necessary to investigate the underlying
offense. Circumscribing the seizures to the underlying objectives will
blunt law enforcement officials' incentive to make the original stop
151 I do not contend that the continuity principle should block all law enforce-
ment measures not linked to underlying justifications. I would permit law enforce-
ment officials to ask questions unrelated to the reason for the stop as long as the
duration is not extended. Authorities can ask questions of anyone on the street so to
cabin authorities by preventing them from conducting any unrelated law enforce-
ment inquiries during the stop seems excessive. See Muehier v. Mena, 125 S. Ct. 1465
(2005) (holding that unrelated questioning does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment). For insightful commentaries calling for greater restraints, see Wayne K.
LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" from Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine, " Not Enough
Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1843 (2004); Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amend-
ment on the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv. 117 (2001).
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because the collateral purpose-investigating for a second, unrelated
offense-will become more difficult. Traffic laws are comprehensive
in their scope, and it is virtually impossible for drivers to travel any
length of distance without violating one of the "multitude of applica-
ble traffic and equipment regulations.' 52 Law enforcement officials
make millions of such stops nationwide each month.
153
Accordingly, law enforcement authorities use minor traffic viola-
tions to pull an individual over to see if they can find other evidence
of a crime, even when the officer has no articulable reason for believ-
ing the individual guilty of anything other than the minor traffic viola-
tion. Indeed, law enforcement officials are unabashedly unapologetic
for using such strategies to combat transportation of illegal drugs and
other contraband.1 54 In some cases, as in Caballes, the officers' in-
stinct reaps law enforcement dividends. In millions of others, how-
ever, the hunches have not paid off.
For instance, consider the facts in Chavez v. Illinois State Police.
155
There, a motorist involved in another case, People v. Koutsakis,156 hired
Peso Chavez to recreate the circumstances leading to the motorist's
arrest and charge.1 57 Chavez, who is Hispanic, proceeded on Inter-
state 80 with a member of the Public Defender's Office in a car be-
hind. At mile post fifty-three, Chavez passed Trooper Larry Thomas
who then proceeded to follow Chavez for twenty-four miles, both be-
hind and next to him, and then finally stopped him allegedly because
Chavez failed to signal a lane change (although Chavez and the mem-
ber of the Public Defender's Office testified to the contrary).158
Trooper Thomas was then joined by the same Trooper Gillette as in
Caballes. They conducted a criminal background check, as in Caballes,
questioned Chavez about his itinerary, asked for permission to search
his car and, when Chavez refused, they detained him further to per-
152 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979).
153 In Maryland alone, for instance, there are a million such traffic stops each year.
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 418 (1997).
154 See, e.g., DEA, Operations Pipeline and Convoy, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
programs/pipecon.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2005). In Illinois, the Illinois State Police
launched Operation Valkyrie to interdict drugs through enforcement of routine high-
way safety regulations. See Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 621-22 (7th
Cir. 2001) (discussing the history of the program); see also People v. Brownlee, 713
N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ill. 1999) (concerning an officer who admitted that he had never
pulled over a driver for failing to signal within 100 feet of changing lanes but decided
to do so to "see if something would come of it").
155 251 F.3d at 623-24.
156 649 N.E.2d 605 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
157 Chavez, 251 F.3d at 623.
158 Id. at 623.
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mit Trooper Graham (also involved in Caballes) to arrive with his po-
lice dog. 159 Graham testified that the dog alerted, and the troopers
thereafter conducted a full search of the car, finding nothing. Chavez
ultimately was released, and the field report listed Chavez as
"white."1 60
Few such cases wind up in court, yet, as a result, (disproportion-
ately minority) 161 motorists are subject to delay and embarrassment,
likely leaving them even more mistrustful of law enforcement authori-
ties.162 If the Court does not confine minor traffic violations to the
purpose of the stop, then law enforcement authorities can exercise
unbridled discretion in determining whom to stop, and how long to
detain such individuals to permit them time to follow through their
hunches. Just as with the general searches for customs violations at
the time of the Framing, permitting officials to extend Terry stops to
investigate unrelated crimes provides too much license for law en-
forcement officials. The issue should not be whether three (or four
or five) minutes of extra detention is too much- any extra detention
is unreasonable if the purposes animating the lawful stop have already
been satisfied. The continuity requirement demands a cutoff point
tied to the purpose justifying the initial deprivation of privacy.
B. Muehler
Decided several months after Caballes, the Court in Muehler v.
Mena163 confronted a fact pattern suggesting that a lawful detention
had been prolonged for unknown reasons. Law enforcement authori-
ties traced a gang member suspected of a driveby shooting to a partic-
ular residence and obtained a warrant to search the residence for
evidence of the shooting and gang membership. In light of the poten-
tial danger raised, a SWAT team arrived early one morning to execute
the warrant. Enforcement officials found Iris Mena asleep in a locked
bedroom in what appeared to be a rooming house. At gunpoint, the
officers placed her and subsequently three others in handcuffs, even
though none of the four was a suspect. The authorities led the four
into a converted garage, where they remained handcuffed for over
159 Id. at 624.
160 Id.
161 Cedric Herring, Racial Profiling and Illinois Policy, POL'YF. (Inst. of Gov't & Pub.
Affairs, Univ. of Ill., Urbana, Ill.), Vol. 14, No. 1, 2000, at 3, available at http://
www.igpa.uiuc.edu/publications/policyforum/pfl 4-1_racialprofiling.pdf.
162 DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE (2002); Herring, supra note 161; Gary
Webb, DWB, ESQUIRE, Apr. 1999, at 118.
163 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005).
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two hours during the search. The suspect was not found; some ammu-
nition and gang paraphernalia were. 164
The law enforcement authorities had notified the INS of the
search given their belief that the gang was comprised principally of
illegal immigrants. During the detention, an INS officer asked the
detainees for their names, backgrounds, and immigration documenta-
tion. Questioning continued off and on for over two hours.1 65 Mena
alleged that she remained in handcuffs for at least fifteen minutes
after the search ended.1
66
Mena subsequently filed a civil rights action under § 1983167
against the officers, alleging that she was detained "for an unreasona-
ble time and in an unreasonable manner"' 68 in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The district court denied the officers' motion to dismiss
on the basis of qualified immunity in part, and set the case for trial.
Pursuant to a special verdict form, the jury found that the officers
violated Mena's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasona-
ble seizures by detaining her both with "force greater than that which
was reasonable and for a longer period than that which was reasona-
ble."' 69 The jury awarded Mena $10,000 in actual damages and
$20,000 in punitive damages against each officer. In denying a mo-
tion for reconsideration, the district court explained that the chal-
lenged jury instruction on prolonged detention "'merely makes clear
that the authority does not persist once the search ends or becomes
improper.'"170
The law enforcement officers appealed, and the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the judgment on two bases. First, it rejected their claim of
qualified immunity on the ground that it was objectively unreasonable
during the more than two hour search to confine her in handcuffs in
the converted garage. The court of appeals asserted that the officers
should have released Mena as soon as it became clear that she posed
no threat of harm. The court also held that the unrelated questioning
into immigration violations constituted a distinct violation, and that
both violations were clearly established at the time of the incident.
171
164 Id. at 1468-69.
165 Id. at 1468, 1471.
166 Brief for the Respondent at i, Muehler, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (No. 03-1423), 2004 WL
2542382.
167 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
168 Muehler, 125 S. Ct. at 1469 (internal quotation marks omitted).
169 Id.
170 Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 332 F.3d 1255, 1268 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated sub
nom. 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005).
171 Id. at 1263-64.
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The Supreme Court reversed on the merits, finding that no
Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.172 The Court reasoned
that, under longstanding precedents, law enforcement authorities
have the right to detain all occupants of a premises during a search,
irrespective of whether the occupants are suspected of foul play. The
right to detain, according to the court, is categorical. 7 3 Moreover,
the Court found nothing unreasonable in the officers' decision to
keep Mena and the others in handcuffs for over two hours given the
potential safety risk posed. 7 4 And, as in Caballes, the Court "rejected
the notion that 'the shift in purpose"' of a detention was, by itself,
unreasonable. 175 Therefore, the Court disagreed with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that the questioning about immigration status in any
way violated the Fourth Amendment.
Unlike in Caballes, the Court recognized that the plaintiff had
also alleged that the officers prolonged the detention past the time
needed to search the premises. Indeed, Mena's first issue presented
to the Court addressed "[w] hether the jury and district court erred by
finding that petitioners violated the Fourth Amendment where the
trial record shows that petitioners, inter alia, detained respondent for
at least 15 minutes after the search ended."1 76 The Court, however, as
it had in Caballes, declined to reach the issue "[b] ecause the Court of
Appeals did not address this contention."' 77 Thus, even though Mena
raised the prolongation issue at trial and the jury returned a special
verdict on that very issue, the Supreme Court ducked the same claim
it had skirted in Caballes.
Given the jury's verdict, the prolongation claim seems straightfor-
ward. Once the jury determined that Mena was detained "for a longer
period than that which was reasonable,"' 78 the Fourth Amendment
violation follows. The question should not be, as Justice Stevens sug-
gested in Caballes, whether the detention in general was reasonable.179
The question should be whether the law enforcement officers contin-
ued to hold Mena once the objective justifying the detention had
ceased. And, the jury apparently had already made the requisite find-
ing of fact.
172 Muehler, 125 S. Ct. at 1468.
173 Id. 1469-70.
174 Id. at 1471.
175 Id.
176 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 166, at i.
177 Muehler, 125 S. Ct. at 1472.
178 Id. at 1469.
179 Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837 (2005).
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The risk of administrative abuse in Muehler is not as great as in
Caballes. Law enforcement authorities do not routinely procure
search warrants for the collateral purpose of questioning occupants of
a dwelling who are not the target of the search, or for the purpose of
subjecting them to indignities. Moreover, authorities should have had
plenty of time to finish questioning Mena during the (perhaps too)
lengthy search of the premises. A protracted detention of Mena
seems, at least in hindsight, as unneeded as it was unwarranted.
Nonetheless, the continuity principle in Mueher is critical to cir-
cumscribe the discretion of law enforcement officials. Such officials
have the authority to detain individuals for a wide variety of reasons,
whether to investigate individuals near a crime site, passengers in a car
stopped for a routine violation, or whatever. The power to detain
should not give authorities the power to prolong the detention to in-
terrogate at will or just because the authorities do not like an individ-
ual's attitude. The authority to detain individuals against their will is
one of the most august that governments can wield. Such depriva-
tions should be constrained: the detention must end once the reasons
justifying the detention cease.
C. Alford
In Devenpeck v. Alford,I80 police office'r Haner passed by what ap-
peared to be a disabled car on the side of a road. As he sought to turn
around to come to the motorist's aid, he saw another car pull up be-
hind the disabled car and flash "wig-wag" headlights-headlights
equipped on police vehicles that can flash the left and right lights
alternately. As Haner approached the disabled car, he saw an individ-
ual whom he later learned to be Alford return to the second car. In
passing, Alford explained to Haner that the first car had a flat tire and
that he had given the motorist a flashlight. Haner then turned to the
stranded car, whose occupant informed him that the tire was fixed
and that he thought that Alford was a cop in part because of the wig-
wag lights. Haner became concerned that Alford had been imperson-
ating a cop and might be preying on stranded motorists. He called his
supervisor, Devenpeck, who agreed that he should follow and detain
the second car. Devenpeck agreed to join the chase.
181
Haner thereupon drove off after Alford, eventually signaling him
to pull over. Justification presumably lay in the reasonable suspicion
that the driver had been impersonating a police officer. After the
stop, the officer observed that the driver, Afford, was listening to the
180 125 S. Ct. 588 (2005).
181 Id. at 591.
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police frequency on a special radio, and that a hand-held police scan-
ner and a pair of handcuffs were in the car. The officer became more
suspicious that Afford had been impersonating a police officer and
began to question him. Alford informed Haner that he had worked
previously for the state patrol and then claimed instead to have
worked in law enforcement out of state. He explained that the flash-
ing headlights were part of a recently installed car-alarm system. Al-
ford asserted that he did not know how to activate the lights, but
Haner noted one button on the steering wheel that he suspected acti-
vated the lights.
182
Devenpeck then arrived, discussed the situation with Haner, and
inquired of Alford about the lights. Devenpeck noted a tape recorder
on the passenger seat beside Alford with the play and record buttons
depressed. He directed Haner to remove Alford from the car, played
the tape, and confirmed that Alford had been recording his conversa-
tions with the officers. Afford responded that he was carrying a state
court of appeals decision that authorized tape recording of roadside
conversations with police officers. Devenpeck nonetheless informed
Alford that he was being arrested for violating the Washington Privacy
Act. Officers later booked Alford for violating the Act and gave him a
ticket for the illegal flashing headlights. The state trial court subse-
quently dismissed both charges.183
Alford filed suit against the officers, principally alleging that he
had been arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The jury returned a unanimous ver-
dict in favor of the officers.184 A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding no evidence to support the jury's verdict.185 Because
the tape recording was not a crime in Washington, the panel con-
cluded that the arrest had been groundless and therefore in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. 18 6 The panel acknowledged that the of-
ficers might have had reason to arrest Alford for impersonating a po-
lice officer but held that such an offense was neither articulated at the
time of the arrest nor "closely related" to the privacy offense that was
stated at the time of the arrest. 187 The Ninth Circuit relied on its
prior decision holding that an arrest for an unlawful reason could
182 Id.
183 Id. at 591 -92.
184 Id. at 593.
185 Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Devenpeck v.
Alford, 125 S. Ct. 588.
186 Id. at 978.
187 Id.
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only be saved if probable cause existed for a closely related offense.1 88
The panel further rejected the officers' qualified immunity defense,
concluding that a reasonable officer should have known that probable
cause did not exist for the arrest, based on the clarity of the Washing-
ton Privacy Act.
189
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court explained that the criti-
cal question was whether the police officers had probable cause to
believe that a criminal offense had been or was about to be commit-
ted.190 Eschewing a subjective text, the Court stated that the actual
(and not just the articulated) reasons why the officers arrested Alford
were irrelevant as long as reasonable grounds for the arrest in fact
existed. 19 1 To the Court, the impersonation issue provided all of the
reason necessary to satisfy probable cause for the arrest. In other
words, there is no Fourth Amendment right, in the Court's view, to be
informed of the reason for one's arrest. And, no separate interest is
violated when authorities articulate an illegitimate reason for an ar-
rest, as long as there were in fact legitimate grounds upon which to
base the arrest.
The Court next turned to the closely related offense require-
ment, as expounded by the Ninth Circuit and others. 19 2 The Ninth
Circuit had held that no Fourth Amendment violation flowed from an
invalid arrest as long as the grounds that justified the arrest were
closely related to the actual reasons given by the officer. I9 3 If there is
a sufficient nexus between the two offenses, the chance that the origi-
nal arrest was a sham is low. In Alford the connection between the
impersonation and privacy act offenses was attenuated at best. The
closely related offense requirement at first glance seems to mirror the
continuity principle in that it protects law enforcement officials only
when there is little danger that the arrest was pretextual. 194
The Court acknowledged that the closely related test was de-
signed to prevent bad faith arrests.' 95 As one court of appeals had
explained, the test prevented officers from 'justifying what from the
188 See id. at 976-77 (citing Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
189 Id. at 978.
190 Devenpeck, 125 S. Ct. at 593.
191 Id. at 593-94.
192 Sheehy v. Town of Plymouth, 191 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 1999); Vance v. Nun-
nery, 137 F.3d 270, 275 (5th Cir. 1998); Richardson v. Bonds, 860 F.2d 1427, 1430-31
(7th Cir. 1988).
193 Alford, 333 F.3d at 976.




outset may have been actually sham or fraudulent arrests on the basis
of ex post facto justifications that turn out to be valid.' 9 6 Nonethe-
less, the Court found that the closely related test provided inadequate
guidance to police officers who needed to make on the spot decisions
as to whether to arrest specific individuals.
The difficulty, as the Court pointed out, is that there are many
contexts in which arrests are made without resort to warrants. Police
officers may have witnessed a range of conduct and learned of other
acts that give rise to probable cause. On the spot, they may not be
able to untangle the reasons tojustify an arrest as a prosecutor might
after the fact. Indeed, there is no requirement that the officials articu-
late the reasons until the probable cause hearing scheduled soon af-
ter, as required in the Court's County of Riverside decision.19 7 The
Court explained that the "closely related" test is "condemned by its
perverse consequences. While it is assuredly good police practice to
inform a person of the reason for his arrest at the time he is taken into
custody, we have never held that to be constitutionally required."' 9 8
In essence, therefore, unlike in the warrant or Chenery contexts, there
is no record requirement. Police officers do not have the luxury of
sifting through the evidence to determine whether probable cause ex-
ists to make an arrest. In the face of the need to make a split-second
decision, reflection and deliberation are not options. 9 9 Had officers
stopped Caballes because of an overly tinted windshield, the stop
would not have violated the Fourth Amendment if the officers had
made an unreasonable determination about the windshield, as long as
they had reasonable grounds to stop him for speeding.
Sufficient protection for the individual arguably exists in the fact
that the reasons supporting arrest must be apparent to an officer before
the arrest. Otherwise, troopers could stop suspicious looking motor-
ists, arrest them on trumped up charges, and then search their cars. If
the stash found in the trunk or glove compartment could justify the
groundless arrest, then police officers would have impunity to arrest
196 Vance, 137 F.3d at 275.
197 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
198 Devenpeck, 125 S. Ct. at 595.
199 Indeed, some lower courts had previously held that, even when an invalid war-
rant has been issued, no constitutional violation arises if probable cause in fact existed
for an arrest on other grounds. United States v. Fachini, 466 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Wilson, 451 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1971). Courts, in other words, have
not treated the presence of a warrant in the arrest context as a citical protection for
individual liberty. A record requirement is not as important when only the identity of
the suspect is in question and after-the-fact mechanisms exist to determine whether
probable cause in fact existed.
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any individual on a mere hunch that they could then uncover infor-
mation that would justify the arrest after the fact. The need for proba-
ble cause at the outset limits the potential risk of arbitrary police
conduct.
On the other hand, consider that Officers Devenpeck and Haner
subjectively may have believed that Alford was not at all guilty of im-
personation, and may have had no intent to arrest him for that of-
fense. The officers would be protected from suit on the mere hap
that there later turned out to be probable cause justifying the arrest.
Although in a sense the Court did not require continuity of the
justification articulated by the enforcement officer for the seizure, it
required continuity of the justification that in fact legitimized the
seizure. Moreover, the risk of arbitrary conduct is small. Officers
have limited incentive to arrest an individual on a trumped up charge
on the mere chance that probable cause for arresting the individual
on another ground exists. 200 The same danger of overreaching does
not exist as it does in the Caballes context, in which law enforcement
authorities have substantial incentive to stop motorists when probable
cause of some technical violation exists on the off chance that the
motorists are carrying contraband. 20 1 Even in the Muehler context, au-
thorities have the incentive to prolong the detention to engage in ad-
ditional questioning or searching.
If an objective test governs, the question should be whether prob-
able cause is satisfied by the information known to the police officer.
In Alford, Devenpeck knew enough information to justify the arrest on
the impersonation charge. He knew about the wig-wag lights from
Haner, knew that Alford had denied knowing how to use them, and
saw that Afford had both a police scanner and handcuffs in the car.
So, even though the tape recording triggered the arrest, the circum-
stances at the time would have justified an arrest on the impersona-
tion offense. Devenpeck did not have time to reflect clearly on
whether the impersonation or the apparent privacy act violation more
clearly justified the arrest.20 2
200 As Professor LaFave has noted, there is no reason to "assume[ ] [that] police
will conduct searches on grounds they know or suspect to be insufficient in the hope
that their actions will later be upheld on some other grounds of which they are pres-
ently unaware." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 3.1(d), at 114 (4th ed. 2004).
201 In assessing the legality of searches, the Court in the past at times has sup-
ported its decision by noting the lack of incentive for officers to abuse their authority.
See, e.g., infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
202 Consider, however, if a third police officer had stopped Alford for speeding. If
Alford had been arrested for taping the conversation, then the existence of probable
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Viewed in this light, Alford is consistent with the continuity re-
quirement. There was probable cause to arrest Alford. Although po-
lice officers are not estopped from justifying arrests after the fact on
grounds unexpressed at the time of the arrest, they must be able to
point to historical information to justify the arrests. They cannot un-
dertake a search or seizure other than for reasons that pre-existed the
encounter.20 3 Unlike in Caballes, they cannot transform a search or
seizure for one purpose into another in which probable cause (or, at
times, reasonable suspicion) is not present. Thus, despite the surface
similarity to the continuity principle raised in CabalLes and Mueher,
the context in Alford does not raise the same danger of law enforce-
ment overreaching.
Recognizing the continuity principle is critical to cabining the
discretion of law enforcement officials. Officials cannot broaden a
search or lengthen a seizure to undertake an unrelated investigation.
Routine traffic stops should not be the occasion for protracted ques-
tioning and other investigative steps in order to conduct a drug
search, a search for item A should not be parlayed into a fishing expe-
dition for item B or C, and a legitimate effort to arrest a suspect in his
or her home should not provide justification for a full scale search of
the premises. The continuity principle reflects the long-held fear that
governmental officials may be tempted to expand searches and
seizures once they are given a green light to start. The principle does
not redefine the contours of a search or seizure, but rather limits the
scope and duration of such encounters with law enforcement officials.
The principle lies embedded in a number of Supreme Court deci-
sions, but lower courts have at times ignored its reach.
cause to justify arrest on the impersonation charge would vanish. The arresting of-
ficer must have reasonable grounds to know the information justifying the arrest.
203 There is greater danger, however, when the articulated offense and that predi-
cated by probable cause do not arise out of the same set of circumstances. For in-
stance, consider if Devenpeck knew Alford had a reputation for impersonating
officers previously and knew as well that he kept handcuffs and a scanner in the car.
If Devenpeck struck up a conversation with Afford on the street whereupon Alford
turned on a tape recorder leading to the arrest, the prior knowledge of facts demon-
strating probable cause that Alford was guilty of impersonation arguably should not
cure the Fourth Amendment defect. In that setting, it would be unreasonable to
assume that the arrest was made for the impersonation offense, because a reasonable
officer would not have made the arrest for the prior conduct during the encounter
over the taping.
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III. THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRAINT IN
APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Focus on the continuity principle also sheds light on Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence more generally. Fourth Amendment bal-
ancing should include more systematic consideration of whether suffi-
cient constraints are imposed on law enforcement officials. Sound
policy as well as history support that focus. Although the Court has at
times adverted to this goal in cases such as Teny, Hicks, and Dickerson,
its more recent decisions have slighted the importance of restraining
the discretion of enforcement officials on the beat.
204
Understanding the Fourth Amendment in part as a restriction on
law enforcement officials' discretion dovetails with the constitutional
architecture more generally. As has been oft related, the Framers cre-
ated a system of checks and balances in order to minimize the threat
to individual liberty. Madison in particular did not trust government
leaders to represent the public interest, and so endeavored to temper
their zeal through the mechanism of separated powers. Experiences
under the Articles of Confederation and various state constitutions
had painfully proven that such power was subject to abuse. State legis-
lators had constructed a variety of inflationary schemes to aid debtors
to the detriment of creditors both overseas and within the states.
Such legislation not only led to a general decline in confidence (par-
ticularly among the monied classes), but also had led indirectly to so-
cial unrest. The requirement of bicameralism, by requiring the
concurrence of two distinct Houses of Congress "must be in all cases a
salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the peo-
ple by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of
usurpation or perfidy."20 5 Similarly, in Hamilton's words, present-
ment of legislation to the President provides "an additional security
against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check
upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against
the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the
public good."20 6 The Framers slowed the legislative process to ensure
greater time for deliberation to protect individual liberty.
For a nation emerging from the controversies engendered by
general warrants and writs of assistance, the Warrant Clause served
much the same function as the system of separated powers. Just as the
separation of powers doctrine slowed government in general, the War-
204 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188-89 (2004); Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817-18 (1996).
205 THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 333 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
206 THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 205, at 392.
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rant Clause cabined the authority of individual government officials.
As James Otis had argued, general warrants permitted far too much
discretion in low-level officials who were apt to abuse their power,
whether due to lack of judgment or personal motivations. Personal
liberty would suffer. Warrants slowed down the process, forced offi-
cials to articulate their goals with specificity, and permitted ex ante
oversight by a neutral judicial official. The Fourth Amendment served
to protect privacy by imposing restraints on such low-level officials.
20 7
As a consequence, the ambit afforded law enforcement officials
should factor in the Fourth Amendment balancing. This is not to sug-
gest that the Framers anticipated any particular test, but rather that
fidelity to their concerns translates, in today's world, to focusing on
the extent of authority exercised by such enforcement officials. 20 8 If a
warrant is issued, we are protected from discretion by the record.
When warrants are not practicable, the scope of the search and dura-
tion of a seizure can be limited by the continuity requirement. For
warrantless searches and seizures, the constitutionality of the law en-
forcement measure should turn in part on the extent of discretion
afforded law enforcement officials in effecting searches and
seizures. 20
9
Three related factors frame the inquiry. First, the more discre-
tion possessed by the cop on the beat, the greater the potential for an
incursion into privacy. The history of the Warrant Clause, if it demon-
strates anything, suggests the Framers' concern with unbridled discre-
tion wielded by low-level enforcement officials. From this vantage
point, law enforcement schemes that permit officials little leeway-
such as screening at airports-are less problematic than in cases such
as Caballes in which they afford officials the discretion to determine
whom to stop and what to look for.
Second, to the extent that law enforcement officials treat many
individuals similarly, no one individual is singled out for differential
treatment, and the individual subsequently searched will not be as
stigmatized. Again, the screening at airports or the video surveillance
207 Some commentators have similarly concluded that the Takings Clause should
be understood to prevent singling out of citizens for disadvantageous treatment in
regulation. Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries
of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REv. 713 (2002); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. Rrv. 885 (2000).
208 See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. Rrv. 1165 (1993).
209 The concern for limited administrative discretion might be considered as part
of the privacy interest to be balanced against the government's interest in the law
enforcement measure. Similar concerns are weighed in due process balancing under
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976).
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in downtown areas presents a paradigm. To be sure, all citizens would
be treated alike if similarly subject to the arbitrary exercise of power
by law enforcement officials. The detainees suspected of terrorism at
Guantanamo presumably felt little solace in one another's misery.
But, in most contexts, when law enforcement officials treat a great
number of individuals similarly, we are not as concerned that enforce-
ment officials will proceed in an arbitrary manner. When officials rely
on instinct in deciding whom to search and what to seize, the poten-
tial for invidious conduct increases.
Third, the more that the political process is open to challenge
the law enforcement measure, the less the concern for the absence of
a warrant. 210 The political process can serve as a check either before
or after the law enforcement measure is undertaken. Police depart-
ments-like agencies generally-formulate policies of broad applica-
tion only after considerable debate and input from different levels
within the department itself. The presence of prior deliberation and
the knowledge of widespread application serve as some check on arbi-
trary action. The likely debate prior to enactment ensures considera-
tion of the consequences for enforcement and creation of a type of
administrative record as in Chenery. Some law enforcement measures,
of course, are better thought out than others. Yet, we routinely shield
agency policymaking from second guessing in tort suits, even when
evidence of significant deliberation is wanting.211 Individuals, on the
other hand, can sue for the negligence of individual government em-
ployees, because no comparable checks restrain the situation specific
judgments or reactions of agents in the field. Deliberation or partici-
pation in the decisionmaking process is not possible. Officers making
Teny stops or deciding whom to arrest make split-second decisions,
and hence no process is available to check their exercise of discretion.
There was no internal debate preceding the stops in Caballes, the con-
210 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) (arguing that much criminal procedure doctrine
should be revised in light of contemporary urban realities, including minorities' gain
in political power). Professors Kahan and Meares are not as concerned with the exer-
cise of discretion per se as with whether the political process can adequately protect
the interests of those burdened by the law enforcement measure.
211 Congress waived the immunity of federal agencies from tort suits under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, but carved out claims "based upon the exercise or perform-
ance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part
of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000). For a broad description of the
policymaking protected, see United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991) (protect-
ing actions that are "grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime" and "suscepti-
ble to policy analysis").
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tinued detention in Muehler, and the arrest in Alford, but there has
been before establishing systems of video surveillance in streets2 12 and
before establishing screening in airports.
2 13
Moreover, when a search is targeted at citizens generally or at
least at a broad group, the political process is open to curb any law
enforcement excesses after the fact. Those affected are more readily
identifiable and can therefore band together to use the political pro-
cess to protest any overly invasive measure. Aggrieved citizens can
change the measure through the political process unless those
targeted are felons or undocumented aliens. 214 By contrast, searches
and seizures by law enforcement officials on the beat generally affect
only one individual at a time. In such cases, it is more difficult to
predict who will be adversely impacted from such singling out, and
those affected will have great difficulty forming coalitions to oppose
the law enforcement activity due to the lack of identifiability. Citizens
may understand that they might in the future be singled out, but that
very uncertainty undermines their incentive to fight the measure. Ex-
amining these three related factors-the discretion permitted low-
level officials, whether individuals are treated similarly, and the availa-
bility of the political process as a check-suggests that the Supreme
Court has both underprotected and overprotected privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.
Consider, first, a hypothetical statute that every factory is to be
inspected each Tuesday from 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. to determine
compliance with OSHA. Little discretion would be left in the enforce-
ment officer. Factory managers would know that all similarly situated
212 Quentin Burrows, Note, Scowl Because You're on Candid Camera: Privacy and Video
Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 1079, 1080-81 (1997).
213 For a recent legislative initiative in the area, see Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 49 U.S.C.). For a discussion of its enactment, see Tara Branum and
Susanna Dokupil, Security Takeovers and Bailouts: Aviation and the Return of Big Govern-
ment, 6 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 431, 457-59 (2002).
214 Of course, if they are felons, they have less political power. Few legislators lose
votes if they are insensitive to the needs of felons. See generally Donald A. Dripps,
Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don't Legislatures
Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1079 (1993) (using
public choice theory to argue that legislators ignore criminals' rights as a matter of
political expediency); Haroldj. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminal and Civil
Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. LJ. 2143, 2168-69 (1996) (noting that felons often
lack the money and status to influence politicians, and may even lack the right to
vote). Moreover, if law enforcement officials target undocumented aliens in particu-
lar, they are unlikely to have any pull within the political process to curb the zeal of
enforcement officials.
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entities would be subject to an identical search, and they would have
little reason to worry that an official was picking on the particular fac-
tory owner merely because of race, political views, personal animosity,
or whatever.2 15 If the administrative rule required officials to select
randomly one out of each ten factories to search, only modest discre-
tion would exist. Furthermore, if the factory owners object that the
search is too intrusive or unneeded, they can likely resort to the politi-
cal process in an effort to minimize the impact of the search rule.
216
This is not to suggest that Congress or an administrative agency
can legislate away all privacy interests. In the above example, a rule
that each factory's premises must be open for inspection twenty-four
hours a day with no notice would strike most as violative of the Fourth
Amendment irrespective of the fact that all factories would be treated
alike. Nonetheless, a legislative or administrative rule can mute con-
cerns for the exercise of unbridled discretion by street-level officials.
In essence, the legislative act can take part of the place of a warrant by
specifying the timing and scope of such searches-the political pro-
cess is then more open for all to voice their complaints, particularly if
average citizens are affected.
The security checkpoints at airports pose another helpful exam-
ple. The discretion of TSA officials is bounded-everyone must pass
through security, and the news reports that dignitaries such as Senator
Kennedy have been subject to exacting searches reinforce the demo-
cratic nature of the searches. 217 There is still a risk that Congress
could legislate away our privacy rights as some have argued with the
Patriot Act,218 but there is less concern when the law enforcement
measure affects the whole country roughly in the same manner and
redress can be obtained through the political process.
The Supreme Court's decision in Michigan Department of State Po-
lice v. Sitz2O reflects that perspective. There, Michigan had created a
sobriety checkpoint. All drivers were checked for obvious signs of in-
215 Cf Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (addressing permissible ambit
of administrative searches).
216 If there were only one or two factories in the country affected, resort to the
political process most likely would be blocked.
217 Kennedy Ensnared by Terrorism No Fly List, THE FRONTRUNNER, Aug. 20, 2004 at
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; see also Editorial, Glitches in the No Fly List, CrTrA-
NOOGA TIMES FREE PREss, Aug. 25, 2004, at B8 (stating that U.S. Representative John
Lewis from Atlanta is also on the list); Denise Marois, Measure Would Create Appeals
Process for No-Fy List, AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 1, 2004, at 5 (noting that U.S. Representa-
tive Don Young of Alaska has also been stopped because his name is on the no fly list).
218 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to
Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1619 (2004).
219 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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toxication, and the average checkpoint stop lasted for about twenty-
five seconds. 220 The administrative rule, in the words of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, served to "minimize the discretion of the officers on the
scene."22 1 Moreover, the privacy invasion may be less, the Court con-
tinued, because all drivers were treated the same. 22 2 Similarly, a court
of appeals upheld a roadblock on a military base that had been set up
to require identification of drivers. 223 The purposes of the checkpoint
system were to make individuals on the base aware of security proce-
dures and to protect the base itself. The court stated that
"'[r] oadblock seizures are consistent with the Fourth Amendment if
they are carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral
limitations on the conduct of individual officers.'- 224 Given that
the checkpoint stopped every sixth vehicle ... counters any sugges-
tion of subjective intrusion because it might dispel any concern of a
law-abiding motorist that she had been singled out. There is no
evidence that [the driver] was singled out or treated arbitrarily or
that the officers were operating with unfettered discretion as to
which cars to stop.2
25
Accordingly, the court upheld the seizure.
22 6
Indeed, oversight of such checkpoints via the political process is
possible. Citizens have protested against law enforcement use of
checkpoints in a variety of contexts. In a recent election for the
mayor of Montgomery, Alabama, for instance, opponents and the
press criticized the city administration for establishing checkpoints
around the Montgomery Mall, 227 and citizens in Indianapolis pro-
tested about checkpoints established to determine compliance with
seatbelt laws. 228 Hearings on airport safety have been widely publi-
cized. At times, legislators have advanced the cause of citizens and
220 Id. at 447-48.
221 Id. at 452.
222 Id. at 453. The Court reiterated in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95
(1975), that roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their
approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorists can see that
other vehicles are being stopped, they can see visible signs of the officers' authority,
and they are much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.
223 United States v. Green, 293 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2002).
224 Id. at 859-60 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 49 (2002)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (internal citations omitted)).
225 Id. at 860.
226 Id. at 862.
227 William F. West, Candidate Bright Answers Critics, MONTGOMERY ADvERTISER,
Aug. 6, 2003, at Al.
228 Chuck Avery, Angry Consumers Need Outlet, PALLADIUM-ITEM (Richmond, Ind.),
Oct. 28, 2002, at 6A.
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sought to alter law enforcement practice. Congressman Darrell Issa, a
member of the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Secur-
ity and Claims, tried to close immigration checkpoints in his district
because they tied up traffic and because the funds used could be "rer-
outed to more effective use."229 The political process serves as a safety
valve to vent concerns about checkpoints. Individuals affected can
band together to gain redress through the political process.
The political process, however, is not sufficient in and of itself to
protect completely against overreaching at checkpoints. Each stop at
a checkpoint may only take three to five minutes, so that motorists
may not have the incentive to overcome free rider problems to organ-
ize against needless stops. The only citizens injured sufficiently to
mount a challenge are those caught with contraband. Moreover, for
checkpoints near the border or in areas populated by the poor, access
to the political process may be blocked. And, unlike in the era of the
Framing, the current generation of smugglers lacks influence in the
political process. Thejudicial forum should still be open to air Fourth
Amendment challenges, but when the law enforcement measures do
not permit singling out and affect a great number of individuals, there
should be less concern for the legality of the law enforcement
measure.230
Compare the above cases to Delaware v. Prouse231 in which the
Court invalidated the stop of a motorist that was aimed at checking for
driver's license and registration materials. The Court stated that vest-
229 Leonel Sanchez, Issa Meets Checkpoint Supporters, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug.
2, 2002, at B3.
230 Consider, as well, that several law enforcement agencies in the United States
have established DNA dragnets to investigate particularly heinous crimes. For in-
stance, when investigating a series of rapes, police in Ann Arbor, Michigan, obtained
blood samples from 160 African American males, and law enforcement authorities in
San Diego earlier tested approximately 800 African American males in seeking a serial
killer. More recently, police in Miami tested over 2000 individuals in investigating
serial murders, and police in Truro, Massachusetts, have sought to test every male
resident in the town. Amanda Ripley, The DNA Dragnet: To Find a Killer a Town Asks All
Its Men To Give a Sample. Savvy Policing or Invasion of Privacy?, TIME, Jan. 24, 2005, at
39. The very breadth of the searches precipitated news coverage, see, for example,
Mark Hansen, DNA Dragnet: Critics Say Police Employed Heavy-Handed Tactics To Coerce
More than 12,000 People To Give Genetic Samples in the Search for a Serial Killer, A.B.A. J.,
May 2004, at 37, and raised scrutiny of the law enforcement strategy. Given the coer-
cion inherent in many of the searches, the dragnets at times may well have violated
Fourth Amendment rights. Nonetheless, the generality of searches in a sense
checked some of the potential for abuse given that so many individuals were subject
to indignities, and enforcement officials in both cities curtailed the scope of their
investigations.
231 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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ing "unbridled discretion" in officers to stop motorists on the basis of
"inarticulate hunches" could not be reasonable. 232 It further ex-
plained that "[t] his kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion
is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases it has in-
sisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circum-
scribed."23 3 The Court acknowledged that its ruling did not prevent
Delaware "from developing methods for spot checks that involve less
intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discre-
tion."2 3 4 And, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce235 the Court invali-
dated a roving checkpoint near the Mexican border in part because
the roving patrol stops "would subject the residents of ... [border]
areas to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the high-
ways, solely at the discretion of Border Patrol officers. . . . [They]
could stop motorists at random for questioning, day or night, any-
where within 100 air miles of the 2,000-mile-border. '236 The potential
targeting of motorists based on subjective criteria doomed the
scheme. As the Court later summarized, "[t] here also was a grave dan-
ger that such unreviewable discretion would be abused by some of-
ficers in the field."23 7 Unlike in Caballes, therefore, the Court at times
has been sensitive to the need for administrative constraint before up-
holding searches and seizures.
The Court's decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,238 however,
cannot easily be understood within the framework of Prouse and
Brignoni-Ponce. There, the Court reviewed a checkpoint system that
was in many ways similar to that in Sitz with the difference that the
goal was to find not only impaired drivers, but also cars likely carrying
narcotics. The stops, as in Sitz, were relatively short. The Court ex-
plained that, under the rules, "[t]he officers must conduct each stop
in the same manner until particularized suspicion develops, and the
officers have no discretion to stop any vehicle out of sequence."2 39 In
dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that the case was nearly
on all fours with Sitz, and stressed that the stops were "executed in a
regularized and neutral manner."
240
232 Id. at 661.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 663.
235 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
236 Id. at 882-83.
237 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976).
238 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
239 Id. at 35.
240 Id. at 53 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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Nonetheless, the Court ruled the checkpoint unconstitutional be-
cause the principal purpose of the checkpoint was to further ordinary
criminal law enforcement objectives.2 41 Unlike in Sitz, the regulatory
interest sought did not predominate. To the Court, therefore, the
checkpoint was very similar to any routine stop of a traveler, which has
to be preceded by reasonable suspicion.
The check selected by the Court is to insist that any law enforce-
ment search or seizure that circumvents the warrant requirement be
structured in a way that does not look like routine criminal law en-
forcement. The so-termed special needs exceptions validate warrant-
less searches and seizures as long as the government can point to
needs divorced from the general needs of criminal law enforcement,
whether protecting our borders,242 investigating accidents, 243 or main-
taining discipline in the schools. 244
But, the Court in Edmond gave short shrift to the administrative
constraints inherent in the particular checkpoint scheme. First, the
law enforcement officials did not have the discretion to detain any
motorist beyond two minutes or so unless particularized suspicion of
wrongdoing developed. Second, each motorist was treated alike, and
so there was little if any danger of singling out motorists on the basis
of ethnicity, looks, or type of car. Third, the very breadth of the
checkpoints suggests that there was considerable debate about the
propriety of their establishment prior to deployment. If the citizens
of Indianapolis had been outraged at the delays, they could have
banded together to make their voice heard in the legislative or admin-
istrative process to demand that the checkpoints be altered or discon-
tinued,245 much as some citizens attempted in challenging the seatbelt
checkpoints.2 46 To be sure, if the checkpoints were only erected in
particular parts of town, then there would be greater risk of targeting
groups that lacked power in the political process for adverse treat-
241 Id. at 48 (majority opinion).
242 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
243 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (finding drug and
alcohol testing for railway employees involved in train accidents reasonable under
Fourth Amendment); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510 (1978) (holding that
firefighters could collect evidence of arson without warrant immediately after extin-
guishing fire).
244 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
245 See also Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 671 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting) (suggesting in the appellate court that local governments should have
leeway to adopt varying law enforcement techniques because citizens can refuse to
reelect the politicians who put the roadblocks in place).
246 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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ment. On the record, we do not know the process by which the police
department reached the decision where to establish the checkpoints.
My point is not that the discretion exercised by lower level offi-
cials should be dispositive. But it is not clear, a priori, whether the
check of a noncriminal law enforcement purpose 2 4 7 is more critical in
the long run than ensuring that officials have limited latitude in con-
ducting searches and seizures. The lessons from history suggest that a
critical threat to liberty stems from the excessive discretion vested in
low-level enforcement officials.
Finally, a similar issue of administrative constraint underlay the
public housing sweeps cases. On the one hand, to the extent housing
regulations vest discretion in officials to search public housing units at
will, the specter of arbitrary actions looms high. Officials can choose
which units to search and at what time. On the other hand, if every
unit is subject to a search, or the units are selected randomly, then
there is less risk of abuse. Moreover, given the large number of re-
sidents affected, the political process will be open for complaints, and
complaints there have been. 248 And, if the residents support the
sweeps, as they did in some areas,249 that would provide greater assur-
ance of prior deliberation, and greater likelihood of continuing over-
sight.250 The protection of generality and evidence of deliberation do
not remove all Fourth Amendment concerns, but they should limit
the threat to privacy under the Court's balancing framework.
Renewed focus on the risk that cops on the beat at times exercise
excessive discretion can help reorient Fourth Amendment analysis
generally. When law enforcement officials are checked by departmen-
tal rules and the prospect of political oversight, there is less reason to
worry about overreaching. Courts may have scrutinized seizures in Ed-
mond and the housing sweeps cases too stringently. On the other
247 Indeed, the Court in other cases has manifested its impatience with any doc-
trine that turns on the subjective purpose for which an investigation was launched.
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
248 Pratt v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Zionne Pressely,
Privacy or Safety: A Constitutional Analysis of Public Housing Sweep Searches, 6 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 777 (1997).
249 Pratt, 848 F. Supp. at 796-97. That very burdening may minimize concern for
privacy violations. Kahan & Meares, supra note 210.
250 The Clinton Administration established guidelines to provide public housing
authorities with the tools to keep order in the projects, assuring greater visibility for
the issue. See Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., and Henry Cisneros, Sec'y of
Housing and Urban Dev., to William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States
(Apr. 14, 1994), reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. 8299 (1994). The guidelines specify in
part that the sweeps should be undertaken on a regularized basis and advance notice
given.
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hand, when the danger of singling out exists and the political process
is closed to the individuals affected, courts should be much more de-
manding before upholding the contested measure. The decisions in
Caballes, Muehler, Childs, Custer, and Wonders reflect the danger of per-
mitting officials the almost unfettered discretion to stop whomever
they wish and detain for however long they want. The Fourth Amend-
ment demands greater restraint.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Caballes, Muehler, and
Alford bring to the fore a long simmering issue in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence-to what extent should the risk of arbitrary conduct by
law enforcement officials weigh against the constitutionality of war-
rantless searches and seizures. The continuity principle, as exempli-
fied in Hicks and Dickerson, restrains law enforcement officials by
mandating that searches and seizures be cabined by the objectives jus-
tifying their initiation. Searches and seizures cannot be continued
once the underlying purposes have been satisfied. The Supreme
Court should have relied on the continuity principle in resolving the
Fourth Amendment challenges in Caballes and Muehler. The risk that
law enforcement officials will stop motorists on the off chance that
such encounters will yield incriminating information is substantial,
and officials in the past have stopped motorists based on criteria that
most of us find quite troubling. Moreover, there is little reason to
countenance detention of an occupant of a dwelling after a two-to-
three hour search of the premises has been completed.
More broadly, the legitimacy of searches and seizures should turn
in part on whether excessive discretion is vested in law enforcement
officials. When individuals are treated alike as with video surveillance,
and when the investigative measures are preceded by deliberation,
there is less likelihood for misconduct. Far greater abuse can arise
under the enforcement scheme in Caballes than under the checkpoint
operation in Edmond. The history of the Warrant Clause reinforces
that all of us are protected when agents of the state proceed under
clear guidelines.
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